Forfeiture Endangers American Rights

Forfeiture Publications


Abstract of New Law Review Article:
Policing For Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda

FEAR-List Bulletin posted by Brenda Grantland, 3/1/98, abstract by Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen


The following is an abstract of an article just published entitled "Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda," by Eric Blumenson and Eva Nilsen, appearing in the University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 65, p. 35 (Feb. 1998). A companion piece summarizing these findings was published in The Nation magazine this past week.

The abstract (below) was written by the authors themselves. If you want to read the full text of the article, an earlier draft of it is now available on the FEAR website.
 

Abstract:

Policing For Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda

During the 25 years of its existence, the War on Drugs has transformed the criminal justice system, to the point where the imperatives of drug law enforcement now drive many of the broader legislative, law enforcement, and corrections policies in counterproductive ways. One major impetus for this transformation has been the enactment of forfeiture laws which allow law
enforcement agencies to keep the lion's share of the drug-related assets they seize. This financial incentive has left many law enforcement agencies dependent on drug law enforcement to meet their budgetary requirements, at the expense of alternative goals such as the investigation and prosecution of non-drug crimes, crime prevention strategies, and drug education and
treatment. It also threatens to produce a new kind of police agency that is self-financing, independent of government budgetary oversight, and therefore unaccountable.

This article first describes how the forfeiture law's financial largess has kept the drug war's soldiers in business. It then discusses the destructive impact of this economic regime, marshaling evidence to show that the corruption of law enforcement priorities and wholesale miscarriages of justice can be attributed to the operation of these incentives. Finally, it explores potential legal and legislative remedies through which law enforcement may regain its bearings.