UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CRIM. #: 92-288 TPJ
:
FRANK LYNCH IV :
:
Defendant. :

This court has ancillary jurisdiction, under Criminal Rule 41(e), to order the return of property seized in relation to the a criminal case. United States v. Wilson, 176 U.S. App. D.C. 321, 540 F.2d 1100 (D.C.Cir. 1976).

[I]t is fundamental to the integrity of the criminal justice process that property involved in the proceeding, against which no Government claim lies, be returned promptly to its rightful owner.

As in Wilson, the property seized in this case includes property which "is not alleged to be stolen, contraband, or otherwise forfeitable, and which is not needed, or is no longer needed, as evidence." Id. 176 U.S.App.D.C. at 322, 540 F.2d at 1101.

Two automobiles were also seized in this case, neither of which belonged to the defendant, Frank Lynch IV. Although they arguably could be the subject of forfeiture proceedings, 104 days have passed since the seizure of the vehicles, yet no effort has been made by the government to initiate the forfeiture process. The government has not even sent out a notice of forfeiture, which would trigger the administrative forfeiture process and set into motion a series of deadlines designed to ensure the timely processing of the case.

Such a delay in sending out the notice of forfeiture which commences the administrative forfeiture process has been held to be fatal to the government's forfeiture case, as it violates the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title VI, Subtitle B, Sec. 6079, 102 Stat at 4325.

In Dwyer v. United States, the owner of an automobile seized under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881 (due to the alleged use of the vehicle by the owner's boyfriend to transport chemicals for the manufacture of drugs) moved for the return of her property. Because 62 days had passed after the seizure, without notice of forfeiture having been issued to the property owner, an act that would have commenced the administrative and judicial remedies of the case, the District Court held that any forfeiture was time barred under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Section 6080 "Expedited Procedures For Seized Conveyances" (Pub. L. 100-690, Title VI, Subtitle B, Sec. 6080, 102 Stat. 4181, 4326.) See attached copy of opinion.

In this case, 104 days have passed since the seizure of claimants' automobiles. Despite the early entry of counsel, and counsel's efforts to expedite matters, no efforts have been made by the government to begin the forfeiture process by sending notice of forfeiture. Because the statute requires that notice be sent "at the earliest practicable opportunity" after determining ownership, and because ownership of the two seized vehicles was obvious from their vehicle registrations, as well as by the vanity license plate on the 300ZX (FWL III -- not FWL IV) 104 days is not a reasonable time to detain vehicles before deciding whether forfeiture is justified.

The remaining personal property seized from the family of the criminal defendant during this raid is not forfeitable, should not have been seized in the first place, and, once seized, should have been returned immediately.

Now that Frank Lynch IV has pleaded guilty, there is no further reason to detain this property.

For the foregoing reasons, all the property named in the attached Motion For Return of Property should be ordered returned to its rightful owners forthwith.

Respectfully submitted,
 

________________________

Brenda Grantland, Esq. D.C. Bar #362417
P.O. Box 7447
Arlington, VA 22207
(202)546-8890