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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
  
Plaintiff,

v.

APPROXIMATELY \$20,725.00 IN U.S.  
CURRENCY,

APPROXIMATELY \$24,855.00 IN U.S.  
CURRENCY SEIZED FROM SAFE  
DEPOSIT BOX #235,

APPROXIMATELY \$129,676.77 SEIZED  
FROM BANK OF AMERICA ACCOUNT  
NUMBER 02816-06729,

APPROXIMATELY \$11,196.18 SEIZED  
FROM BANK OF AMERICA ACCOUNT  
NUMBER 02810-16004,

APPROXIMATELY \$117,302.47 SEIZED  
FROM BANK OF AMERICA CD ACCOUNT  
NUMBER 02819-08191,

APPROXIMATELY \$185,247.84 SEIZED  
FROM BANK OF AMERICA CD ACCOUNT  
NUMBER 02810-08280,

APPROXIMATELY \$5,242.55 SEIZED  
FROM CHASE BANK ACCOUNT NUMBER  
18212938435,

2:11-MC-00003-JAM-EFB

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES  
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION  
FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY  
PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL  
RULE 41(g) (OR CIVIL  
COMPLAINT IN THE NATURE  
OF MOTION FOR RETURN OF  
PROPERTY)

1 APPROXIMATELY \$479,170.28 SEIZED )  
FROM WEST AMERICA BANK ACCOUNT )  
2 NUMBER 1505054492, )  
3 APPROXIMATELY \$12,305.80 SEIZED )  
FROM CITY NATIONAL BANK ACCOUNT )  
4 NUMBER 25630085, )  
5 APPROXIMATELY \$6,403.46 SEIZED )  
FROM CITY NATIONAL BANK ACCOUNT )  
6 NUMBER 25630413, )  
7 APPROXIMATELY \$12,186.97 SEIZED )  
FROM CITY NATIONAL BANK ACCOUNT )  
8 NUMBER 802820151, )  
9 APPROXIMATELY \$39,715.64 SEIZED )  
FROM CITY NATIONAL BANK ACCOUNT )  
10 NUMBER 2800578, )  
11 APPROXIMATELY \$37,895.74 SEIZED )  
FROM WEST AMERICA BANK ACCOUNT )  
12 NUMBER 505107300, )  
13 APPROXIMATELY \$17,928.84 SEIZED )  
FROM CITY NATIONAL BANK ACCOUNT )  
14 NUMBER 802820585, )  
15 APPROXIMATELY \$12,413.49 SEIZED )  
FROM CITY NATIONAL BANK ACCOUNT )  
16 NUMBER 2249995, )  
17 APPROXIMATELY \$19,675.65 SEIZED )  
FROM CITY NATIONAL BANK ACCOUNT )  
18 NUMBER 2249669, )  
19 APPROXIMATELY \$98,515.79 SEIZED )  
FROM CITY NATIONAL BANK ACCOUNT )  
20 NUMBER 25630652, )  
21 APPROXIMATELY \$7,119.45 SEIZED )  
FROM CITY NATIONAL BANK ACCOUNT )  
22 NUMBER 25630099, )  
23 APPROXIMATELY \$292,573.97 SEIZED )  
FROM WELLS FARGO BANK ACCOUNT )  
24 NUMBER 3598404063, )  
25 APPROXIMATELY \$103,117.83 SEIZED )  
FROM WELLS FARGO BANK ACCOUNT )  
26 NUMBER 910442044750301, and )  
27 )  
28 )

1 APPROXIMATELY \$63,160.41 SEIZED )  
2 FROM WELLS FARGO BANK ACCOUNT )  
3 NUMBER 7936680284, )  
4 Defendants. )

5 Criminal Rule 41(g) provides a remedy for persons aggrieved by the illegal seizure of  
6 property by law enforcement agents, or the illegal detention of the property. Where there is no  
7 related criminal case pending, as here, the motion for return of property is treated as a civil equitable  
8 action.

9 Although Rule 41(g) is ordinarily used to seek return of property after an indictment  
10 is issued, "district courts have the power to entertain motions to return property  
11 seized by the government when there are no criminal proceedings pending against the  
12 movant." *Ramsden v. United States*, 2 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1993) (construing  
former Rule 41(e)). "These motions are treated as civil equitable proceedings, and,  
therefore, a district court must exercise 'caution and restraint' before assuming  
jurisdiction." *Id.*

13 *United States v. Kama*, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005). *See also United States v. Martinson*,  
14 809 F.2d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1987). Because it is an equitable action, the claimant must show the  
15 absence of adequate remedies at law. In cases where the property was seized for forfeiture, as here,  
16 the pendency of civil forfeiture proceedings would deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear a Rule  
17 41(g) motion. Here, however, administrative forfeiture proceedings were commenced by the DEA  
18 in September 2010, and Claimants filed timely claims in October 2010. No other persons came  
19 forward and filed claims. See Stipulation filed in this case, at Doc. 7 p. 3 paragraph 1.

20 As the government stipulated in Doc. 7:

21 Under 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A), the United States is required to file a complaint for  
22 forfeiture against the defendant funds and/or to obtain an indictment alleging that the  
23 defendant funds are subject to forfeiture within 90 days after a claim has been filed  
in the administrative forfeiture proceedings, unless the court extends the deadline for  
good cause shown or by agreement of the parties.

24 To allow the government to conclude its investigation, after receiving ample documentation from  
25 Claimants as to the legitimate sources of the seized bank accounts, Claimants agreed to two  
26 extensions of that deadline. This case was filed by the government for the purpose of extending its  
27

1 deadlines for filing the complaint. When Claimants refused to agree to any further extensions, the  
2 government let its April 15, 2010 deadline run and then filed a Notice of Election, stating its  
3 intention not to file a forfeiture complaint. Doc. 10, filed May 17, 2011. It has now been more than  
4 nine weeks after its deadline ran for filing a forfeiture complaint, yet the United States has not  
5 returned the money to the Claimants. Yesterday DEA official Lawrence D'Orazio emailed counsel  
6 stating the United States intends to turn the property over to Tehama County *again* to allow it to  
7 pursue forfeiture under state law.

8         This money, representing virtually all of the bank accounts and most of the liquid assets of  
9 both Claimants, has now been detained an entire year without probable cause. There was never any  
10 showing of probable cause to seize the bank accounts. They were seized from the banks under the  
11 apparent authority of a state search warrant. The affidavit supporting the search warrant does not  
12 even attempt to show probable cause to believe the bank accounts contain proceeds of any crime,  
13 or any other grounds for forfeiture.

14         Prior to the federal adoption of the state seizure, Tehama County initiated the state forfeiture  
15 process against these seized funds on or about July 20, 2010 by serving notice of non-judicial  
16 forfeiture under Health & Safety Code § 11488.4(j). See Doc. 11-4. Claimant Frankovich responded  
17 by filing in Superior Court of Tehama County, a Claim Opposing Forfeiture on August 6, 2010, and  
18 paying the filing fee. The Tehama County District Attorney having invoked the jurisdiction of  
19 Tehama County Superior Court by serving the § 11488.4(j) notice of non-judicial forfeiture, and  
20 Frankovich having filed a timely claim, § 11488.4(j) required Tehama County to file a state  
21 forfeiture petition within 30 days. "If a claim is timely filed, then the Attorney General or district  
22 attorney *shall file a petition of forfeiture pursuant to this section within 30 days of receipt of the*  
23 *claim.*" *Id.* No such state forfeiture petition was ever filed. See Exhibit 1 hereto, a computer  
24 printout of the docket in Frankovich's Claim Opposing Forfeiture, Tehama County Superior Court  
25 Case #CI63918.

1 On September 27, 2010, Frankovich filed a motion for return of property under state law,  
2 which entitled him to an evidentiary hearing, at which the government would be required to put on  
3 evidence establishing probable cause for the detention. Doc. 11-6.

4 Despite having invoked the jurisdiction of the Tehama County Superior Court by  
5 commencing the non-judicial forfeiture process, and without a court order from Tehama County  
6 Superior Court releasing the property from its jurisdiction, the District Attorney of County turned  
7 the property over the DEA under the federal adoption program. When Frankovich went to court in  
8 Tehama County Superior Court demanding his evidentiary hearing, the District Attorney avoided  
9 the evidentiary hearing by saying it was not seeking forfeiture under state law. The District Attorney  
10 wanted Claimant to stipulate that the property would be turned over to the federal government for  
11 forfeiture under federal law, after which time it would return to Tehama County jurisdiction if the  
12 federal government declined forfeiture. Claimant refused, and insisted that the state court release  
13 all of the seized property unconditionally, which the court did. See order Doc. 11-7. When the court  
14 asked whether the action should be dismissed with or without prejudice, Claimant requested that it  
15 be dismissed without prejudice, because the only matters filed in the case were the Claim Opposing  
16 Forfeiture, and Claimant's Motion for Return of Property. The county never having filed a forfeiture  
17 petition, there was no forfeiture to dismiss with prejudice. Rather, the county government had  
18 defaulted by failing to file a forfeiture petition within 30 days after service of the claim. Given this  
19 procedural history in Tehama County before and after the adoptive federal administrative process  
20 was even commenced, forfeiture under state law would be barred by H&S § 114884(j), judicial  
21 estoppel (Tehama County having conceded it was not pursuing state forfeiture to avoid having to  
22 show probable cause at the November 17, 2010 evidentiary hearing on the motion for return of  
23 property), and due process of law.

24 The United States Supreme Court has held that Rule 41(g) is a proper remedy for asserting  
25 ones' rights to prompt return of property that has been seized illegally and held an unreasonable time  
26 without the institution of forfeiture proceedings. *See United States v. \$8,850*, 461 U.S. 555, 569

1 (1983). The Court applied the four factor speedy trial balancing test of *Barker v. Wingo*, 407 U.S.  
2 514 (1972) for determining when delay in instituting a forfeiture case violates due process. *Id.* 461  
3 U.S. at 564. Those factors are: length of delay, reason for the delay, claimant's assertion of the  
4 right, and prejudice.

5 With regard to the first factor, length of delay, the Supreme Court said:

6 Little can be said on when a delay becomes presumptively improper, for the  
7 determination necessarily depends on the facts of the particular case. Our inquiry is  
8 the constitutional one of due process; we are not establishing a statute of limitations.  
9 Obviously, short delays -- of perhaps a month or so -- need less justification than  
longer delays. We regard the delay here -- some 18 months -- as quite significant.  
Being deprived of this substantial sum of money for a year and a half is undoubtedly  
a significant burden.

10 *Id.* at 565. In \$8,850 the challenged delay of 18 months was the "length of time between the seizure  
11 and the initiation of the forfeiture trial." Here, no forfeiture case has even been commenced by any  
12 entity, the federal government has declined to initiate a forfeiture action, and the state has already  
13 had the chance and waived it.

14 With regard to the reasons for delay, the Supreme Court relied on the pendency of a petition  
15 for remission. *Id.* at 566. Here, both the state and federal government both initiated administrative  
16 proceedings and then abandoned them when the Claimants filed claims. In \$8,850 the government  
17 also relied upon the pendency of criminal proceedings against the claimants. *Id.* at 567. No  
18 criminal charges have been filed against Claimants in any court. The Supreme Court noted that  
19 some delay is tolerated for investigating a case to determine whether the government should decline  
20 forfeiture.

21 Both the Government and the claimant have an interest in a rule that allows the  
22 Government some time to investigate the situation in order to determine whether the  
23 facts entitle the Government to forfeiture so that, if not, the Government may return  
the money without formal proceedings.

24 *Id.* at 565. Here, the Claimant stipulated to two requested extensions of time filed in this proceeding,  
25 and approved by this court, to allow an investigation which would certainly reveal what the  
26 Claimants have been saying all along -- there are no evidence that proceeds of any crime were  
27 deposited into any of these accounts. Indeed, the U.S. Attorney's Office filed a notice declining

1 forfeiture after concluding its investigation. However, Claimants did not consent to this delay  
2 merely to allow the federal government to toss the case back to Tehama County for another bite at  
3 the apple. During the November 17, 2010 hearing in Tehama County, when Frankovich insisted on  
4 the state government showing probable cause or releasing the assets unconditionally, Claimant  
5 pointed out that the federal government had already declined forfeiture for the first bank account  
6 (totaling \$500,000), after finding no evidence the account contained forfeitable proceeds. Claimant  
7 told the court that the same result would likely happen to the remaining bank accounts once the  
8 federal prosecutor conducted an investigation, and that the county prosecutor was taking the chance  
9 of that result when deciding to forego state forfeiture in order to avoid having to show probable  
10 cause.

11 The third factor is assertion of the right to a prompt determination of grounds for forfeiture.  
12 Frankovich promptly asserted that right in state court by filing the motion for return of property, and  
13 by insisting that the evidentiary hearing go forward on the first scheduled date. Claimants have not  
14 caused any delay in this case. The only delays chargeable to both parties are the two brief extensions  
15 stipulated to in this case. But Claimants only stipulated to the extensions to allow *the federal*  
16 *government* to conduct its investigation and determine whether grounds existed to pursue forfeiture  
17 under federal law. Claimants did not consent to this extension to give Tehama County another  
18 chance to pursue forfeiture under state law.

19 The final factor is prejudice. Claimants describe the prejudice from the seizure and detention  
20 of virtually all of their liquid assets in the Declaration of Thomas Frankovich, Exhibit 2 to this  
21 memorandum. If 18 months' delay is "quite significant" or "undoubtedly significant" for the  
22 deprivation of a mere \$8,850, depriving Claimants of \$1.5 million – virtually all of the liquid assets  
23 of both Claimants and Frankovich's law practice for one entire year without any process, is far  
24 beyond the limits tolerated by the Due Process clause.

25 For the above reasons, the reasons set out in the revised Memorandum of Law In Support of  
26 Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, filed today, the declarations and exhibits and procedural  
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1 history in this case, and any further reasons as may appear from a hearing on this motion, this Court  
2 should grant the Temporary Restraining Order, and then after a hearing on this motion, should order  
3 the United States to return the seized funds to Claimants forthwith, with interest.

4 Dated: 6/24/2011

Respectfully submitted,

5  
6 /s/ Brenda Grantland  
BRENDA GRANTLAND  
Attorney for Claimants  
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