1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Mark T. Clausen (Calif. SB# 196721)
Attorney at Law
10918 Rio Ruso Drive
Windsor, California 95492
Telephone: (707) 838-2215
Facsimile: (707) 575-3826
Email: MarkTClausen@AOL.com

Attorney for Plaintiff
Yasmeen Tanzel

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 
COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, MARTINEZ BRANCH

[AN UNLIMITED CIVIL ACTION] 

YASMEEN TANZEL,					Case No. C 03-02841

	Plaintiff,						PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM  
								OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
vs.								IN OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER					 
THE CITY OF RICHMOND,				Hearing Date: March 8, 2004
								Time: 9:00 a.m.
	Defendant.						Dept.: 33
____________________________________/

	Plaintiff Yasmeen Tanzel respectfully submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the City of Richmond’s Demurrer. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Topic	Page

I. 	Introduction and summary of arguments.	1

II. 	Statement of Facts.	1

III.  	Argument.	2

A. 	Plaintiff has standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a
	to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief.	2
	
B. 	The First Cause of Action states a viable claim for relief because due
	process and the Fourth Amendment require a prompt post-seizure
	“probable cause” hearing in which the court may release a vehicle
	pendente lite.	3

	1.  	There are necessarily lengthy delays between seizure and a hearing
		on the merits.	4

	2.  	Application of the Fourth Amendment.	5

	3. 	Application of the Due Process Clause.	8

		a.  	The Private Interest Effected.	8

		b.  	The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation Through the Procedures
			Used and the Probable Value of Other Safeguards.	9

		c.  	The Government’s Interest.	11

C.  	The Second Cause of Action states a viable claim for relief because due
	process requires forfeiture claimants be afforded the right to a jury trial.	13

D. 	The Third Cause of Action states a viable claim for relief because due
	process is violated by the City Attorney’s and Richmond PD’s direct
	pecuniary interest in forfeiture.	13

E. 	The Fourth Cause of Action states a viable claim for relief because when
	declaring forfeiture by default the City Attorney acts in an adjudicative
	roll where he has a heightened duty of financial impartiality under both
	federal and state law.	30

CONCLUSION	30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases	Page(s)

Alaska v. Cessna Finance Corp. 
(Alaska Supreme Ct. 1981) 626 P.2d 104	13

Ames v. Hermosa Beach 
(1971)16 Cal. App. 3d 146	3

Augustus v. Roemer 
(1991 E.D. LA) 771 F. Supp. 1458	22

Baca v. Padilla 
(N.M. Supreme Ct. 1920) 190 P. 730	18, 28

Bennis v. Michigan 
(1996) 516 U.S. 442 [116 S. Ct. 994, 134 L.Ed. 2d 68]	8, 12

Blair v. Pitchess 
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 258	2, 3

Board of Supervisors v. Simpson 
(1951) 36 Cal. 2d 671	6

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. United States 
(5^th Cir. 1969) 411 F.2d 312	17

Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 
(1974) 416 U.S. 663 [40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080]	11

California Teachers Assn. v. State of California 
(1999) 20 Cal. 4th 327	5

Callahan v. Jones 
Wash. Supreme Ct. 1939) 93 P.2d 326 [200 Wash. 241]	17

Cantrell v. Commonwealth 
(1985) 229 Va. 387 [329 S.E.2d 22]	17

City of Tampa Bay v. Acosta 
(1994 Fla.App.) 645 So. 2d 551	10

Coleman v. Watt 
(8th Cir. 1994) 40 F.3d 255	8

Commonwealth v. Ellis 
(Mass. Supreme Ct. 1999) 708 N.E.2d 644 [29 Mass. 362]	20, 26

Commonwealth v. Eskridge 
(1992) 529 Pa. 387 [604 A.2d 700]	17
Commonwealth v. One (1) 1993 Pontiac Trans AM 
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) 809 A.2d 444	11

Commonwealth v. Tabor 
(1978) 384 N.E.2d 190 [376 Mass. 811, 818-820]	17

Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. 
(2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 16	1, 2

Cornelius v. Los Angeles County Authority 
(1992) 49 Cal.App.4th 1761	2

County of Nassau v. Canavan 
(N.Y. Supreme Ct. Nov. 24, 2003) 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 3969	3, 8, 10, 11, 12

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin 
(1991) 500 U.S. 44 [114 L. Ed. 2d 49, 111 S. Ct. 1661]	5

Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property 
(Supreme Court of Florida 1991) 588 So. 2d 957	3, 8

District of Columbia v. Patterson 
(D.C. App. 1995) 667 A.2d 1338	3

Ex Parte Kelly 
(Ala. Supreme Ct. 1999) 766 So. 2d 837 	10

Ganger v. Peyton 
(4th Cir. 1967) 379 F.2d 709	17, 23, 24, 29

Gerstein v. Pugh 
(1975) 420 U.S. 103 [43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854]	5, 9, 11

Gete v. INS 
(9th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 1285	13

Goodman v. Brasseria La Capannina, Inc. 
(Florida Supreme Ct. 1992) 602 So. 2d 1245	3

Haas v. County of San Bernardino 
(2002) 27 Cal. 4th 1017	22

Hambarian v. Superior Court 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 826	20, 26

Hubbell, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport 
(Conn.Sup. Ct. 1996) 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 281	21, 22

In re Davidson 
(5th Cir. 1990) 908 F.2d 1249	17

In re Ridgely 
(Del. Supreme Ct. 1954) 106 A. 2d 527 [48 Del. 464]	17

In re Murchison 
(1955) 349 U.S. 133 [99 L. Ed. 942, 75 S. Ct. 623]	30

In re Walters 
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 738	5

Kasler v. Lockyer 
(2000) 23 Cal. 4th 472	5

Kehoe v. City of Berkeley 
(1977) 76 Cal.App.3rd 667	2, 3

Krimstock v. Kelly 
(2^nd Cir.2002) 306 F.3d 40 	3, 4, 5, 6, 7 , 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 

Kutschbach v. Davies 
(S.D. OH 1995) 885 F. Supp. 1079	11

Lee v. Thornton 
(2d Cir. 1976) 538 F.2d 27	3

Libretti v. United States 
(1995) 516 U.S. 29 [133 L. Ed. 2d 271, 116 S. Ct. 356]	25, 29

Luedeke v. Village of New Paltz 
(N.D. N.Y. 1999) 63 F. Supp. 2d 215	7, 8

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. 
(1980) 446 U.S. 238
[64 L. Ed. 2d 182, 100 S. Ct. 1610]	15, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28

Mathews v. Eldridge 
(1976) 424 U.S. 319 [47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893]	8, 9, 11

Mendoza v. County of Tulare 
(1982) 128 Cal. App. 3d 403	1, 2

Meyer v. Niles Township 
(N.D. Ill. 1979) 477 F. Supp. 357	22

Morrissey v. Brewer 
(1972) 408 U.S. 471 [33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593]	6

Nasir v. Sacramento County Off. of the Dist. Atty. 
(1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 976	8, 14

New Jersey v. Imperiale 
(Dist. of NJ 1991) 773 F. Supp. 747	18
1990 Chevrolet Blazer v. City of Tarpon Springs 
(Fla.App. 1996) 684 So. 2d 197	10

One (1) Charter Arms v. State 
(Miss. Supreme Ct. 1988) 721 So.2d 620	10

One (1) 1979 Ford v. State 
(Miss. Supreme Ct. 1998) 721 So.2d 631	10

One 1995 Toyota Pick-up Truck v. District of Columbia 
(D.C. App. 1998) 718 A.2d 558	10

One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania 
(1965) 380 U.S. 693 [14 L. Ed. 2d 170, 85 S. Ct. 1246]	5

People v. Barboza 
(1981) 29 Cal. 3d 375	19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29

People v. Eubanks 
(1996) 14 Cal. 4th 580	15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27

People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe 
(1951) 37 Cal. 2d 283	13

People v. Parmar 
(2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 781	25

People v. 6344 Skyway Paradise, California 
(1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 1026	12, 28

People v. Snow 
(2003) 30 Cal. 4th 43	20

People v. Superior Court (Plascencia) 
(2002) 103 Cal. App. 4th 409	13

People v. Swink 
(1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1076	8

People v. Zimmer 
(1980) 51 N.Y.2d 390
[434 N.Y.S.2d 206, 414 N.E.2d 705]	17

People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court 
(1985) 39 Cal. 3d 740	16, 18, 19, 24, 25, 28

Pollgreen v. Morris 
(S.D. Florida, Miami Div. 1980) 496 F. Supp. 1042	3

Price v. Caperton 
(Ky. App. 1864) 62 Ky. 207	28
Salcido v. Woodbury County 
(N.D. Iowa 2000) 119 F. Supp. 2d 900	22

State v. Chinn 
(W.Va. 1961) 146 W. Va. 610 [121 S.E.2d 610]	17

State v. Detroit Motors 
(L. Div. 1960) 163 A. 2d 227 [62 N.J. Super. 386]	17

State v. Eldridge 
(Tn. Ct. App. 1997) 951 S.W.2d 775	17

State v. Hochhausler 
(Ohio Supreme Court 1996) 76 Ohio St. 3d 455 [668 N.E.2d 457]	11

State v. One Black 1989 Cadillac 
(N.D. Supreme Ct. 1994) 522 N.W.2d 457	3, 6

State v. Tate 
(La. Supreme Ct. 1936) 171 So. 108 [185 La. 1006]	17

State ex rel. Schrunk v. Metz 
(Oregon App. 1993) 125 Ore. App. 405 [867 P.2d 503]	3, 8, 13

Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. 
(1998) 17 Cal. 4th 553	28, 29

State v. Eldridge 
(Tn. Ct. App. 1997) 951 S.W.2d 775	17, 29

State v. Storm 
(NJ. Supreme Ct. 1995) 141 N.J. 245 [661 A.2d 790]	7, 15, 24

Stypmann  v. City and County of San Francisco 
(9^th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 1338	6, 8, 9

Tobe v. City of Santa Ana 
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069	2

Tumey v. Ohio 
(1927) 273 U.S. 510 [71 L. Ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437]	22, 23, 24, 25

United Church of the Medical Center v. Medical Center Commission 
(7^th Cir. 1982) 689 F.2d 693	22, 30

United States v. Funds Held ex rel. Wetterer 
(2^nd Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 96	14

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property 
(1993) 510 U.S. 43 [126 L.Ed.2d 490, 114 S.Ct. 492]	10, 12, 27

United States v. Michelles Lounge et al 
(7^th Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 684	10

(United States v. Monsanto 
(2^nd Cir. 1991) 924 F.2d 1186	13

United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 
(7th Cir. 1980) 618 F.2d 453	13

United States v. One 1995 Chevrolet Tahoe 
(W.D. Tenn. 1999) 108 F. Supp. 2d 954	3, 5, 6, 10

United States v. $191,910.00 in United States Currency 
(9^th Cir. 1993) 16 F.3d 1051	13, 14

United States v. That Certain Real Property Located
at 632-636 Ninth Avenue, Calera, Alabama 
(N.D. Ala. 1992) 798 F.Supp.1540	14

United States v. Valdes 
(11^th Cir. 1989) 876 F.2d 1554	6

United States Currency in the Amount of $ 150,660.00 
(8th Cir., 1992) 980 F.2d 1200	14

Van Atta v. Scott 
(1980) 27 Cal. 3d 424	1, 2, 3

Ward v. Village of Monroeville 
(1972) 409 U.S. 57 [34 L. Ed. 2d 267, 93 S. Ct. 80]	22, 23, 24, 25, 30

Weldon v. State 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1997) 718 So.2d 52	10

White v. Davis 
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 757	2

Wilson v. New Orleans 
(La. 1985) 479 So.2d 891	21, 22

Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A. 
(1987) 481 U.S. 787 [95 L. Ed. 2d 740; 107 S. Ct. 2124]	15, 26, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29, 30

Law Review Articles

Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be Fair?
Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution 
(1994) 39 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1	27, 29

Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy 
(1986) 82 Iowa L. Rev. 183	7, 13

Criminal Forfeiture and the Necessity for a Post-Seizure Hearing: 
Are CCE and RICO Rackets for the Government?
57 St. Johns L. Rev. 776-804 (Summer 1983)	3

Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes:
The Need for Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing 
34 Southwestern L.J. 925 (1981)	3

End-Running the Fourth Amendment: Forfeiture Seizures of Real 
Property Under Admiralty Process
 25 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 59 (1987)	3

Follow the Money: Getting to the Root of the Problem
with Civil Asset Forfeiture in California 
(2002) 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1635	29

Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda 
(1998) 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35	7, 23, 26, 27, 29

Other Secondary Sources

Blumenson & Nilsen, The Next Stage of Forfeiture Reform, 
14 Federal Sentencing Reporter No. 2, p. 76 (Sept./Oct. 2001)	29

Cover Story: New Jersey’s Statute Held Unconstitutional: 
Prosecutors May Not Benefit From Forfeiture Cases 
The Champion (Sept./Oct/ 2003) 27 Champion	29

California Statutes 

Health & Safety Code Sections:

	11469	14, 19

	11470	14

	11488.4	5, 7, 14

	11488.5	14

	11489	14

	11490	14

	11492	5, 7, 14
Penal Code Sections:

	825	5

	859b	5, 13

	866	13

	871	13

	872	13

	991	5, 13

	1268 et seq. 	5, 13

	1318 et seq. 	5, 13

	1538.5	13

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. 	Introduction and summary of arguments.
	Plaintiff Yasmeen Tanzel brings a taxpayer suit under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a challenging the constitutionality of Richmond Municipal Code Chapter 11.94 (hereinafter “Chapter 11.94"), which allows vehicles used to purchase or attempt to purchase drugs of any kind and in any amount, or to solicit or attempt to solicit prostitution, to be declared a “nuisance” and seized and forfeited, with the proceeds from forfeiture or monetary settlement in lieu of forfeiture divided between the Richmond City Attorney’s Office and the Richmond Police Department. (Richmond Municipal Code [“RMC”] §11.94.100, subds. (2) and (3).)
	The City of Richmond (“the City”) raises five grounds on demurrer labeled as A through E.  Grounds A through C are directly contrary to binding California Supreme Court precedent which holds that a taxpayer has standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, and accordingly states a “case or controversy” for purposes of declaratory and injunctive relief, even if others with “direct” standing can file or have filed suit on their own. (Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 424, 447-450; Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 16, 29-31; Mendoza v. County of Tulare (1982) 128 Cal. App. 3d 403, 415.)  Ground E is not applicable because there are no “as applied” challenges in the complaint, only facial challenges. This leaves Ground D, which essentially urges that each cause of action fails on the merits.  It is here where the court should focus because the merits of each claim are issues of law which can and should be decided on demurrer. As plaintiff will explain, each cause of action is viable so the City’s demurrer should be overruled.
II. 	Statement of Facts.
	Plaintiff Yasmeen Tanzel is a taxpaying resident of the City who has standing to bring this action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. (Comp, ¶ 1.)  On or about January 2003, the Richmond Council adopted Chapter 11.94, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.  Shortly thereafter the ordinance became operative and effective and since that time it has been enforced by paid employees of the City. (Complaint [“Comp.”], ¶ 2.)  A true copy of Chapter 11.94 is attached as Appendix A. (See Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice.)  

III.  	Argument.
A. 	Plaintiff has standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a to obtain declaratory 
	and injunctive relief. 

	Although Code of Civil Procedure section 526a is designed to enable “a large body of the citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement” (Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 267-268), “the existence of individuals directly affected by the challenged governmental action ... has not been held to preclude a taxpayers' suit.  Numerous decisions have affirmed a taxpayer's standing to sue despite the existence of potential plaintiffs who might also have had standing to challenge the subject actions or statutes. [fn.].” (Van Atta v. Scott, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 447-448.)  The Supreme Court in Van Atta reaffirmed that taxpayers may maintain an action under CCP section 526a even though persons directly affected by the challenged government action also have standing to sue.  (Id., at p. 489; see also Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 92 Cal. App. 4th 16, 30.)  As explained in  Mendoza v. County of Tulare, supra, 128 Cal. App. 3d 403, “directly aggrieved parties and taxpayers have concurrent standing to bring suit to enjoin government action.” (128 Cal.App.3d at p. 415.) 
	Cornelius v. Los Angeles County Authority (1992) 49 Cal.App.4th 1761, 1779, on which the City exclusively relies (City’s Brf., 3:21-28), involved a suit against a  local government entity by a person who was not a resident of the county and did not pay property taxes  to the county, and whose state taxes bore only a tangential relationship to the challenged program. “Whatever might be the merits of indulging in a restrictive definition of ‘taxpayer’ in such circumstances, the decision is inapposite” because plaintiff at bar is a resident taxpayer. (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 92 Cal. App. 4th 16,  30; Comp., ¶ 1.)  The right of plaintiff as a resident taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of Chapter 11.94 is indisputable. (See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084-1086; Blair, supra,  5 Cal.3d 258, 267-271; Connerly, supra, 92 Cal. App. 4th 16, 29-31; White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 762-763; Kehoe v. City of Berkeley (1977) 76 Cal.App.3rd 667, 669-671; Ames v. Hermosa Beach (1971)16 Cal. App. 3d 146, 149-151.)^1

^1As explained in Blair, the “waste and expenditure of public funds” component of section 526a is satisfied here by paragraph 2 of the Complaint, which alleges that the City uses paid employees to implement and enforce Chapter 11.94. (Blair v. Pitchess, supra, 5 Cal.3d 258, 267-268, 286, fn. 21; see also Kehoe v. City of Berkeley, supra, 76 Cal.App.3d 667, 670.)

	The cases just cited further demonstrate that the City is wrong to argue that plaintiff lacks standing to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief because she cannot show the inadequacy of a legal remedy or the existence of a “case or controversy.” (City’s Brf., 4:3-5:4.)  “An action, such as this one, which meets the criteria of [CCP] section 526a satisfies case or controversy requirements.” (Van Atta, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 450, fn. 28, citing Blair v. Pitchess, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 269.)
B. 	The First Cause of Action states a viable claim for relief because due process and the Fourth Amendment require a prompt post-seizure “probable cause” hearing in which the court may release a vehicle pendente lite.

	In Krimstock v. Kelly (2^nd Cir. 2002) 306 F.3d 40 [Appendix B] and County of Nassau v. Canavan (N.Y. Supreme Ct. Nov. 24, 2003) 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 3969 [Appendix C], the 2^nd Circuit and New York Supreme Court conclude that because of the delay between the seizure of a vehicle for purposes of forfeiture and a hearing on the merits, due process and the Fourth Amendment require a prompt post-seizure “probable cause” hearing in which the court may grant pendente lite release on such conditions as are necessary to protect the government’s interests pending trial, such as the posting of a bond or the issuance of a restraining order. (See also Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property (Supreme Court of Florida 1991) 588 So. 2d 957, 964-966.)^2  Plaintiff submits these holding apply equally to Chapter 11.94.

^2
	Similar conclusions have been reached by other courts. (See, e.g., State ex rel. Schrunk v. Metz (Oregon App. Ct. 1993) 125 Ore. App. 405 [867 P.2d 503]; United States v. One 1995 Chevrolet Tahoe (W.D. Tenn. 1999) 108 F. Supp. 2d 954; State v. One Black 1989 Cadillac (N.D. Supreme Ct. 1994) 522 N.W.2d 457, 468-471 (Meschke, J., concurring); Goodman v. Brasseria La Capannina, Inc. (Florida Supreme Ct. 1992) 602 So. 2d 1245; Lee v. Thornton (2d Cir. 1976) 538 F.2d 27; Pollgreen v. Morris (S.D. Florida, Miami Div. 1980) 496 F. Supp. 1042; District of Columbia v. Patterson (D.C. App. 1995) 667 A.2d 1338, 1340-1342, and id, at p. 1348 (Wagner, C.J., diss.) [discussing but not deciding correctness of trial court’s order requiring a probable cause hearing].)  Numerous law review articles have also concluded that a prompt post-seizure, pre-trial probable cause hearing is constitutionally required. (See, e.g., Strafer, End-Running the Fourth Amendment: Forfeiture Seizures of Real Property Under Admiralty Process, 25 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 59 (1987); Note, Criminal Forfeiture and the Necessity for a Post-Seizure Hearing: Are CCE and RICO Rackets for the Government?, 57 St. Johns L. Rev. 776-804 (Summer 1983); Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need for Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Southwestern L.J. 925 (1981).)

	1.  	There are necessarily lengthy delays between seizure and a hearing on the merits.
	Under Chapter 11.94, once a vehicle is seized, the City Attorney and Richmond PD are required to ascertain the identities and addresses of all interested parties and serve notice of seizure and intent to forfeit in person or by mail. (RMC §11.94.080, subd. (c) and (d).)  Once notice is received, an interested party has 10 days to file a claim opposing forfeiture. (RMC §11.94.090, subd. (a).)  No hearing can occur sooner than 30 days after the filing of a claim opposing forfeiture (RMC §11.94.090, subd. (b)(1)), but there are no outer time limits for a hearing – the process is entirely open-ended.  Before a hearing can take place, the City Attorney must file a petition for forfeiture (RMC §11.94.080, subd. (g) [30 days to file a petition for forfeiture after a claim is filed]), the petition must be served (no time limits), an answer to the petition must be filed (no time limits –but presumably the 30 day period of Code of Civil Procedure section 412.20 applies ), the matter must be at-issue such that a hearing date can be set, and the hearing is thereafter held on an unspecified date following the setting – no trial preference is afforded. (See Contra Costa Superior Court, Local Rule 5(h).)  Thus, under the plain language of the ordinance, a hearing on the merits will not take place for at least several months after the seizure. (Comp., ¶¶ 7-8; and see Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d 40, 54.)^3

^3The City notes that Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 54, fn. 14, cites with approval Health & Safety Code section 11488.5, subdivision (c)(1) – which provides that "forfeiture proceeding shall be set for hearing on a day not less than 30 days [from the submission of a claim opposing forfeiture].” (Emphasis added.)  The City argues that this shows Krimstock would approve of the nearly identical language in RMC section 11.94.090, subdivision (b)(1), which provides: “If a verified claim is filed, the forfeiture proceeding shall be set for hearing on a day not less than thirty (30) days therefrom.” (Emphasis added.) But from the context of the discussion and the ultimate holding in Krimstock, it is clear the court misread Health & Safety Code section 11488.5, subdivision (c)(1), as providing for a hearing not more than 30 days after the submission of a claim, rather than not less than 30 days. (See Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 53-54, 59.)  Read correctly, Health & Safety Code section 11488.5, subdivision (c)(1), and RMC section 11.94.090, subdivision (b)(1), do not provide for a timely or “expedited” hearing on the merits (cf. City’s Brf., 9:11-23), but instead guarantee at least a 30 day delay between the filing of a claim opposing forfeiture and a hearing; with absolutely no limits on the maximum delay between seizure and a hearing.  This is constitutionally inadequate. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 53-54; and id. at p. 59 [open ended delays of a month or more do not satisfy constitutional requirements –  “The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments demand a more expeditious determination of a vehicle owner's rights.”].)

	Moreover, unlike Chapter 11.94, California’s forfeiture statutes expressly provide for pre-trial probable cause hearings, motions for immediate return of property, and pendente lite release of property. (Health & Safety Code §§11488.4, subds. (g) and (h), and11492, subd. (c); and see Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 55.)  Thus, any approval of the California system expressed in Krimstock must be qualified by the recognition that California law provides for the very probable cause hearing and right to pendente lite release which plaintiff insists, and Krimstock found, is constitutionally required.

While it is theoretically possible for such a hearing to occur sooner, it is clear that in most if not all cases there will be long delay between seizure and a hearing on the merits. "[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions." (California Teachers Assn. v. State of California (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 327, 347; see also Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 472, 501-502.) 
	2. 	Application of the Fourth Amendment.
	As discussed in United States v. One 1995 Chevrolet Tahoe, supra, 108 F. Supp. 2d 954, 957, the Fourth Amendment demands that a law enforcement agency’s probable cause determination be subject to some type of prompt judicial review after a warrantless arrest. (Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 [43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854]; County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991) 500 U.S. 44, 57 [114 L. Ed. 2d 49, 111 S. Ct. 1661]; In re Walters (1975) 15 Cal.3d 738, 751-752.)^4 This rule should apply equally to the seizure of vehicles under Chapter 11.94 because nuisance abatement/forfeiture is “quasi-criminal” in nature. (One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania (1965) 380 U.S. 693, 700 [14 L. Ed. 2d 170, 85 S. Ct. 1246]; One 1995 Chevrolet Tahoe, supra, 108 F. Supp. 2d 954, 956; see also Board of Supervisors v. Simpson (1951) 36 Cal. 2d 671, 674.)

^4
	The City misses the point when it discusses the delay between a custodial arrest and trial in criminal cases (City’s Brf., 8:20-9:7), because the constitution requires at least a cursory probable cause determination by the court within 48 hours in such cases and California law requires a full adversarial probable cause hearing within 10 days in felony cases – not 20 as argued by the City (Pen. Code §859b) – and a less thorough hearing within 3 days in misdemeanor cases (Pen. Code §991), and permits release from custody on bond or SOR/OR pending trial in both felony and misdemeanor cases (Pen. Code §§1268 et. seq., and 1318, et. seq.) – which the court generally considers at the arraignment within 48 hours of arrest. (Pen. Code §825.)  If Chapter 11.94 provided similar rights regarding the seizure and release of property then the analogy to criminal law would be apt, but it does not.

“For the like warrantless seizure and arrest of a person, the same constitutional guarantee in the Fourth Amendment requires that a judicial determination of probable cause be made promptly as a prerequisite to pretrial detention of the person. ... Logically, similar promptness should be necessary for judicial attention to a warrantless seizure of property.

“ [¶¶ ...] The short time [required] for judicial attention to a warrantless seizure of a person is ... closely related -- if it is not exactly the same -- to the time essential for judicial attention to a warrantless seizure of movable property. [¶¶ ...]  While I do not suggest that it should be heightened to the same level of scrutiny as an ex parte loss of liberty, which occurs with a warrantless arrest, an ex parte loss of property on a warrantless seizure carries with it the same policy consideration, which is that an ex parte seizure of private property by the government is of sufficient concern so as to require ... a ‘prompt’ probable cause determination.” (State v. One Black 1989 Cadillac (N.D. Supreme Ct. 1994) 522 N.W.2d 457, 468-471 (Meschke, J., concurring) [internal citations omitted].)

“A seizure of property [for purposes of forfeiture] ... is essentially the same as the arrest of a person. In both cases, the object seized is believed to have committed a crime. ... In both cases, the police must possess articulable facts to support such belief before they can take the object into custody. Moreover, if the owner of property seized [for purposes of forfeiture] ... believes that his property was seized without probable cause, the law provides him remedies essentially the same as those provided arrestees.” (United States v. Valdes (11^th Cir. 1989) 876 F.2d 1554, 1559.)

	Thus, in United States v. One 1995 Chevrolet Tahoe, supra, 108 F. Supp. 2d 954, 956-958, the court relied on case law affording the right to a prompt post-seizure probable cause hearing following an arrest to conclude that such hearings are constitutionally required in forfeiture proceedings where, as here, “a seizure has occurred based upon a non-judicial finding of probable cause.” (108 F. Supp.2d at 959, fn. 9.)  
	In the absence of prompt post-seizure review by a neutral fact-finder, there arise “grave Fourth Amendment concerns as to the adequacy of an inquiry into probable cause that must wait months or sometimes years before a civil forfeiture [hearing] takes place” (Krimstock, supra,  306 F.3d 40, 50-51); and these concerns are heightened by the fact that the decision to seize property is based on a one-sided view of the facts and law and dependent upon information provided by the Richmond PD which cannot be considered wholly neutral in the first instance (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 485-486 [33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593];Stypmann  v. City and County of San Francisco (9^th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 1338, 1343) and the City Attorney and Richmond PD “ha[ve] a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding” (Krimstock, supra,  306 F.3d 40, 51; Luedeke v. Village of New Paltz (N.D. N.Y. 1999)  63 F. Supp. 2d 215, 221),  which skews their ability to make a fair assessment of the propriety of seizure and forfeiture (State v. Storm (NJ. Supreme Ct. 1995) 141 N.J. 245, 253; 661 A.2d 790, 794) and gives rise to the risk that they will leverage an owner’s immediate need for his vehicle in order to obtain a monetary settlement and thereby avoid judicial scrutiny (Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, supra, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 183, 220; and see RMC §11.94.100 [allowing monetary settlements in lieu of forfeiture]) – just as occurred 225 years ago under the customs writ of assistance. (Blumenson and Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda (1998) 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35, 75-77, fns. 143-151 [“Policing for Profit”].)^5

^5
	Writs of assistance authorized customs officers to seize suspected contraband and to retain a share of the proceeds, often a third, for themselves and their informants.  From the viewpoint of the Crown, this incentive helped to ensure that goods landing in American ports were taxed or, if prohibited, confiscated.  But for the colonists, it was an outrage that brought with it corrupt officials, lawless seizures, selective enforcement, and fabricated evidence which led to fortunes being put into private pockets. “If the [seized] property was used in commerce, then each day spent fighting to establish a claim was another day's business lost. Consequently in colonial admiralty court, officials and property owners struck deals that placed the owner in the peculiar position of paying the state for the return of property.” (Id., p. 77, fn. 149.) From these complaints "the child Independence was born." (Policing for Profit, supra, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35, 76.)

	In recognition of these constitutional requirements and concerns, federal forfeiture laws provide for either a pre- or post-seizure probable cause evaluation by the court (and in some instances both), and also provide for release pending a determination on the merits. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 50, 61-62 and fn. 23; see also 18 U.S.C. §985, subd. (e) [if the court authorizes an ex-parte seizure of real property “it shall conduct a prompt post-seizure hearing”].) Similarly, many states provide for a prompt post-seizure probable cause hearing or other mechanism to secure release of property pending a final determination on the merits, including California. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 54-55; Hlth. & Sfty. Code §§11488.4, subds. (g) and (h), and 11492, subd. (c).)  No such provisions are available under Chapter 11.94 and for this reason it fails to satisfy the commands of the Fourth Amendment. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 50-51.)^6   

^6
	The City erroneously argues that Chapter 11.94 does not expressly prevent a claimant from seeking or a court from granting release of a vehicle pendente lite, and therefore such relief can be sought the day after a seizure. (City’s Brf., 9:3-7.)  In fact, the court’s jurisdiction is invoked upon the City Attorney’s filing of a petition for forfeiture – which does not need to occur until 30 days after the filing of a claim opposing forfeiture. (RMC §11.94.080, subd. (g).) Prior to that, the proceedings are “administrative” or  “non-judicial” in nature. (Nasir  v. Sacramento County Off. of the Dist. Atty., supra, 11 Cal. App. 4th 976, 983-984.)  To invoke the court’s jurisdiction prior to the filing of a petition for forfeiture, a claimant would have to file an entirely separate civil action, but Chapter 11.94 expressly prohibits such actions. (RMC section 11.94.090, subd. (b)(3) [prohibiting cross-complaints, joinder or coordination of actions].) Even if a court would entertain a separate action, the onus should be on the City to provide constitutional rights, not on claimants to sue to secure them. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 59-60; Luedeke v. Village of New Paltz, supra, 63 F. Supp. 2d 215, 223-224.) 

	In any event, it is not enough that Chapter 11.94 does not expressly prohibit motions for a probable cause finding or pendente lite release.  To pass constitutional muster, Chapter 11.94 must expressly provide for a probable cause hearing and release pendente lite. (County of Nassau v. Canavan, supra, 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 3969; Krimstock v. Kelly, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 58-60; see also Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, supra, 588 So. 2d 957, 964-966; and see People v. Swink (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1076, 1081-1083 [laymen must be given express notice of the actions they may take to protect their property interests].)

	3. 	Application of the Due Process Clause.
	Turning to the Due Process Clause, the test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 [47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893], weighs heavily in favor of affording a prompt post-seizure probable cause hearing. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d 40; State ex rel. Schrunk, supra, 125 Ore. App. 405, 415-418 [867 P.2d 503]; Stypmann, supra, 557 F.2d 1338, 1342-1345.)
	a.  	The Private Interest Effected.
	The first factor to be considered in the Mathews inquiry is "the private interest affected by the official action." (Mathews, 424 U.S. at p. 335.) “The deprivation of real or personal property involves substantial due process interests.”(Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 60-61.)  This is especially true where the property is a vehicle, because "automobiles occupy a central place in the lives of most Americans, providing access to jobs, schools, and recreation as well as to the daily necessities of life" (Coleman v. Watt (8th Cir. 1994) 40 F.3d 255, 260-61) and an owner's "ability to make a living" may depend  the "uninterrupted use of an automobile.”(Stypmann, supra,  557 F.2d 1338, 1342-43; Bennis v. Michigan (1996) 516 U.S. 442, 473 [116 S. Ct. 994, 134 L.Ed. 2d 68] (Kennedy, J., diss.) [an automobile “is a practical necessity in modern life for so many people”]; Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 61.)
	“Another consideration is the length of deprivation, which increases the weight of an owner's interest in possessing the vehicle.” (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 61-62.)  Under the plain language of Chapter 11.94, a hearing on the merits will not occur until many months after the initial seizure. (Comp., ¶¶ 7-8; Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 59.)  In the absence of a probable cause hearing and the opportunity for pendente lite release, this delay is simply too long to satisfy due process. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 59-60;  Stypmann, supra, 557 F.2d at p. 1344 [“A five-day delay in justifying detention of a private vehicle is too long” and is “clearly excessive”].)
	b.  	The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation Through the Procedures Used and the Probable Value of Other Safeguards.

	The second factor to be considered under the Mathews test is "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at 335.)  The particular deprivation with which we are concerned here is the post-seizure, pre-judgment retention of property. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 62.) Neither the Richmond PD’s or City Attorney’s unreviewed probable cause determinations or a court's ruling in the distant future on the merits of the forfeiture claim can fully protect against an erroneous deprivation of a claimant's possessory interest as his or her vehicle sits idle in police custody for months. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 62; see also Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 103, 117.)  Although Krimstock concludes that, on balance, the second Mathews factor weighed in favor of the City of New York because a trained police officer’s determination that a driver is intoxicated can typically be expected to be accurate (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 62; see also id., pp. 50-51 and fn. 11), it described the City's victory as “a narrow one” (id., 63) and said:
 “The scales are very nearly in equipoise, however, in light of the comparably greater risk of error that is posed to innocent owners, the City's direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of forfeiture proceedings, and the lack of adequate recompense for losses occasioned by erroneous seizures of vehicles.” (Id., p. 64.)

	Here, in contrast, a Richmond police officer’s or deputy city attorney’s determination that property has been used in connection with drug or prostitution activity is not nearly as reliable as a DUI determination. (See Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 50-51  [contrasting New York’s DUI forfeiture scheme with federal forfeiture for drug offenses].)  But regardless of the comparative difficulty of proving the specific offenses at-issue under Chapter 11.94, the failure to afford a prompt hearing following a non-adversarial seizure invariably gives rise to a substantial risk of error (United States v. Michelles Lounge et al (7^th Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 684, 699; United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 54-57 [126 L.Ed.2d 490, 114 S.Ct. 492] [“Good Real Property”]), which increases because seizures occur “based upon a non-judicial finding of probable cause” (One 1995 Chevrolet Tahoe, supra, 108 F. Supp. 2d 954, 959, fn. 9) and the Richmond PD and City Attorney have a pecuniary interest in the property seized. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 63; Good Real Property, supra, 510 U.S. 43, 54-56.)
	Additionally, even where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense giving rise to forfeiture has been committed, other factors come into play with respect to the legality of seizure and forfeiture, such as “innocent ownership” and the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause.  (County of Nassau v. Canavan, supra, 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 3969; Krimstock v. Kelly, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 57-60.)^7 The fact police have not erred in concluding an offense has been committed “is no comfort to the owner of a vehicle that has been seized because someone else operated it in violation of the law.” (State v. Hochhausler (Ohio Supreme Court, 1996) 668 N.E.2d 457, 466; accord Kutschbach v. Davies (S.D. OH 1995) 885 F. Supp. 1079, 1091-1093.)  There is thus an unacceptable risk of erroneous deprivation of innocent owners’ vehicles. (Good Real Property, supra, 510 U.S. 43, 54-56; Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 55-58 [“heightened potential for error”] and p. 63 [risk of error is “substantial”]; Kutschbach, supra, 885 F. Supp. 1079,  1091 [risk “is extraordinarily high”]; Hochhausler, supra, 668 N.E.2d 457, 466 -467 [risk of error is “extremely high”]; County of Nassau v. Canavan, supra, 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 3969 [“great” risk].)  In sum, the second Mathews factor, like the first, weighs in favor of plaintiff.

^7
	For example, in One 1995 Toyota Pick-up Truck v. District of Columbia (D.C. App. 1998) 718 A.2d 558, the court held that forfeiture of a vehicles based on a single act of soliciting prostitution violated the Excessive Fines Clause. Similarly, numerous courts have held that the possession or purchase of a small quantity of narcotics – such as occurs under the reverse “stings” generally employed under Chapter 11.94 – does not justify forfeiture of a vehicle within the parameters of the Excessive Fines Clause. (See Ex Parte Kelly (Ala. Supreme Ct. 1999) 766 So. 2d 837 [prohibiting forfeiture of a automobile where the driver and passengers were found in possession of 4 tablets of a controlled substance called “aminorex” and a bag containing 6.2 grams of marijuana]; City of Tampa Bay v. Acosta (Fla.App. 1994) 645 So. 2d 551 [driver purchased $20.00 worth of crack cocaine]; 1990 Chevrolet Blazer v. City of Tarpon Springs (Fla.App. 1996) 684 So. 2d 197) [driver found in possession of 27 grams of marijuana]; One (1) Charter Arms v. State (Miss. Supreme Ct. 1988) 721 So.2d 620 [possession of a single rock of cocaine];  Galloway v. City of Albany, Mississippi, supra,  (Miss. Supreme Ct. 1999) 735 So. 2d 407 [passenger sold small amount of prescription drugs]; Weldon v. State (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) 718 So.2d 52, 53 [forfeiture of BMW resulting from possession of marijuana is constitutionally excessive, in part because the defendant had no previous convictions]; Dent v. State  (Ala. 1997) 714 So.2d 985, 987 [lower court found forfeiture of van under state drug laws excessive, in part because defendant lacked criminal record]; Commonwealth v. One (1) 1993 Pontiac Trans AM (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) 809 A.2d 444, 445 [6.68 grams of marijuana].)

	c.  	The Government’s Interest.
	The third Mathews factor examines "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335.)  In Krimstock, the City of New York relied on Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974) 416 U.S. 663 [40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080] to argue that it should be permitted to retain possession of property pending a final determination on the merits in order to prevent the property from being sold or destroyed before a court can render judgment.  The City makes the same argument here. (City’s Brf. 7:27-8:9.)  As Krimstock properly concludes, the critical difference between Calero-Toledo and the present case is that the property at-issue here has already been seized and is in the hands of law enforcement or prosecutorial authorities, so there is no danger that the property will abscond or be sold or destroyed if a probable cause hearing is provided.  (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 65-66; see also Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 103, 113-114 [“Once the suspect is in custody ... the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate”].)  Moreover, the forfeiture statute at-issue in Calero-Toledo provided for notice within 10 days of seizure and an immediate, post-seizure hearing upon the submission of a claim opposing the seizure. (Calero-Toledo, supra, 416 U.S. at pp. 65-66 and fn. 2.) As already discussed, no similar provision is present here.
	Continued retention may be unjustified when other means of restraint would accomplish the City's interests. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 65-66, citing Good Real Property, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 59.)  For example, claimants could post bond or a court could issue a restraining order to prohibit the sale or destruction of the property pendente lite. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 66 and fn. 26; County of Nassau v. Canavan, supra, 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 3969; Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, supra, 588 So. 2d 957, 964-966.)  A bond is in some respects a superior form of security than retention pendente lite because it entails no storage costs or costs of sale which, under RMC §11.94.100, are paid from forfeiture proceeds. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 66; and see People v. 6344 Skyway Paradise, California (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1034 [storage costs often exceed the value of the property forfeited].)
	A second reason offered by the City of New York in Krimstock for continued retention, also urged by the City here, is the need to prevent the seized property from being used as an instrumentality in future criminal acts. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 66-67.) But the hearing sought by plaintiff is designed to determine whether there is in fact probable cause to believe the property was used as an instrumentality of crime, to assess the likelihood of its future use in a similar manner pendente lite, and to determine whether a claimant is likely to prevail on an affirmative defense such as “innocent ownership” or disproportionality under the Excessive Fines Clause. (Ibid; County of Nassau v. Canavan, supra, 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 3969.)  Moreover, continued retention of property pendente lite is ill-suited to prevent recidivism because it leaves the alleged offender free to engage in criminal conduct targeted by Chapter 11.94 through the use of other un-seized vehicles (or by non-vehicular means), while depriving potentially innocent owners of the often indispensable benefits of daily access to their vehicles. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at pp. 66-67; County of Nassau v. Canavan, supra, 2003 N.Y. LEXIS 3969; Bennis, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 465 (Stevens, J. diss.) [“confiscating petitioner's car does not disable her husband from using other venues for similar illegal rendezvous, since all that is needed to commit this offense is a place”; the need to “abate” the car as a “nuisance” disappears the moment it is no longer being used for illicit purposes].)  It is not the vehicle, but the person who used the vehicle to engage in illegal activity, which poses the danger to society. (Krimstock, supra, 306 F.3d at p. 66; Alaska v. Cessna Finance Corp. (Alaska Supreme Ct. 1981) 626 P.2d 104, 111-115].)
	With respect to the burden on the City, complying with its constitutional obligation to provide a prompt “probable cause” hearing would not be unduly burdensome for the City Attorney or Richmond PD, as “[a]ll that [they] would be required to do is provide to [the court and vehicle] ... owners information that is already in [their] possession” and on which their decisions to seize and hold a vehicle is based. (Gete v. INS (9th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 1285, 1298-1299.)  That the State of California provides for similar hearings in forfeiture proceedings (see H & S §§11488.4, subds. (g) and (h)), is additional evidence that the procedure sought is not overly burdensome. (State ex rel. Schrunk, supra, 125 Ore. App. 405, 418 [867 P.2d 503].) Indeed, by requiring a hearing, the court would require nothing more than what law enforcement and prosecuting agencies are required to do on a daily basis in hearings to set or reduce bail or consider release on SOR or OR (Pen. Code §§1268 et. seq., and 1318, et. seq.), establish probable cause for charges (Pen. Code §§859b, 866, 871, 872, 991), or determine the legality of a search or seizure or the continued retention of seized property (Pen. Code §1538.5). (See United States v. $191,910.00 in United States Currency, supra, 16 F.3d 1051, 1067.)  If the City “finds the pretrial litigation of probable cause [and release pendente lite] unduly burdensome in a given case, it can always forgo the imposition or continuation of pretrial restraints and rely upon post-[judgment] forfeiture.” (United States v. Monsanto (2^nd Cir. 1991) 924 F.2d 1186, 1202, fn. 8.) Accordingly, the First Cause of Action states a meritorious claim for relief. 
C.  	The Second Cause of Action states a viable claim for relief because due process requires forfeiture claimants be afforded the right to a jury trial.

	The right to trial by jury in forfeiture actions is guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. (People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe (1951) 37 Cal. 2d 283; People v. Superior Court (Plascencia) (2002) 103 Cal. App. 4th 409, 424-433; United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz (7th Cir. 1980) 618 F.2d 453, 456.)  The City offers no argument or authority to the contrary. 
D. 	The Third Cause of Action states a viable claim for relief because due process is violated by the City Attorney’s and Richmond PD’s direct pecuniary interest in forfeiture.

	Allocating forfeiture revenue to the City Attorney and Richmond PD under RMC §11.94.100 is an “unseemly” arrangement (Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy (1986) 82 Iowa L. Rev. 183, 220), and “‘built-in’ conflict of interest” (United States v. That Certain Real Property Located at 632-636 Ninth Avenue, Calera, Alabama (N.D. Ala. 1992) 798 F.Supp.1540, 1551) which is “corruptive” and “creates incentives that evidently require a more-than-human judgment and restraint” (United States v. Funds Held ex rel. Wetterer (2^nd Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 96, 110), because it places the City Attorney and Richmond PD in a position where the “smell of money” has the potential to skew their discretionary decisions (United States Currency in the Amount of $150,660.00 (8th Cir., 1992) 980 F.2d 1200, 1208 (Bright, J., diss.)) by tempting them to improperly use forfeiture to generate revenue for their agencies. (Funds Held ex rel. Wetterer, supra,  210 F.3d 96, 110; United States v. $191,910.00 in United States Currency (9^th Cir. 1994) 16 F.3d 1051, 1068-1069 and fns. 36 & 37; Policing for Profit, supra, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35.)  This provides “strong incentives” for “even the most honest” law enforcement agents and deputy City attorneys to “pursue forfeitures for improper purposes” and “encourag[es] seizures [and prosecutions] in marginal cases” to force settlements – and “one can only imagine what kind of encouragement this gives dishonest agents.”(Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, supra, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 183, 220.)^8

^8While California’s asset forfeiture statutes permit the distribution of forfeiture revenue to prosecutors and police (H&S §11489), the City has only loosely patterned Chapter 11.94 after the state drug forfeiture statutes (H& S §§11469-11495) while removing all of the safeguards found in those statutes – which are intended to bring state law into compliance with constitutional requirements so as "to ensure that peoples' property rights, and due process rights are protected." (Bill Analysis of A.B. 114, Assem. Comm. on Public Safety, April 20, 1993, p. 1.)

	The state scheme provides a host of protections not present in Chapter 11.94, such as limitations on the use of forfeiture proceeds, express admonishments against allowing forfeiture revenue to affect decision-making, and prohibitions on forfeitures which are grossly disproportional to the gravity of the underlying offense  (H&S §11469); mandated criminal convictions as a pre-requisite to forfeiture in almost all cases (@ 11488.4, subd. (i)); protection for innocent owners and exemptions for community property vehicles, common carriers and employers (@ 11469, subd. (j), 11470, subds. (e) and (g), 11488.5, subd. (e), 11488.6, 11490); pre-trial motions for a probable cause determination and return of property (@ 11488.4, subds.(g) and (h)); and pendente lite orders. (@ 11492, subd. (c).)  

	State law also allocates only 10% of forfeiture proceeds to prosecutors and 65% to police, with the remainder going to various state funds and programs (@ 11489, subd. (b)); requires publication of seizure and in tent to forfeit as well as personal or mail service on all known interested parties (@11488.4, subds. (c)-(e)); and provides 30 days to file a claim opposing forfeiture. (@11488.5, subd. (a)(1).)  Whereas Chapter 11.94 splits forfeiture proceeds 50%-50% between police and prosecutor (RMC §11.94.100(3)), does not require notice by publication even where service in person and by mail is unsuccessful (RMC §11.94.090), and allows only 10 days to file a claim opposing forfeiture (RMC §§11.94.090(g)) – an extraordinarily short period of time which the legislature saw fit to expand to 30 days after the court in Nasir v. Sacramento County Off. of the District Attorney (Nasir) (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 976 called the 10 day period “extremely abbreviated” and suggested it may not meet constitutional requirements.

	And even with these substantial differences, in Samples v. Lockyer, First District Court of Appeal, Div. 2, Case No. A102873, Sonoma County Superior Court Case No. 231307, the state scheme is being challenged on pecuniary interest/due process grounds similar to those raised here.

	The importance to the public, as well as individuals accused of crimes and those with an interest in property sought to be forfeited because of those alleged crimes, that the City Attorney’s prosecutorial discretion be exercised "with the highest degree of integrity and impartiality, and with the appearance thereof," cannot easily be overstated. (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 580, 589 [“Eubanks”].) “While ... [prosecutors] have a duty of zealous advocacy, ‘both the accused and the public have a legitimate expectation that his zeal . . . will be born of objective and impartial consideration of each individual case.’” (Id, at 590, internal citation omitted.)  Conflicting financial interests can undermine the City Attorney's impartiality, which can affect his assessment of probable cause to proceed, the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, the willingness to settle, and the terms of settlement, as well as implicate his ethical obligation to see that the forfeiture claimant is accorded procedural justice and property is seized and forfeited only with sufficient evidence. (State v. Storm, supra, 661 A.2d 790, 794.) A financially interested prosecutor “undermines confidence in the integrity of the [forfeiture] proceeding” and “creates an appearance of impropriety” that diminishes faith in the fairness of the justice system  (Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A. (1987) 481 U.S. 787, 810, 811  [95 L. Ed. 2d 740, 107 S. Ct. 2124] [“Young”]); and without "both the appearance and reality of fairness” which "generat[es] the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done" (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. (1980) 446 U.S. 238, 242 [64 L. Ed. 2d 182, 193, 100 S. Ct. 1610] [“Jerrico”]), the confidence of society is lost and “the concept of the rule of law cannot survive.” (People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 740, 746 [“Clancy”].)
	In Young, supra, 481 U.S. 787, the High Court held that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not serve as the prosecutor of criminal contempt charges for alleged violations of that order because he acts under an insurmountable conflict of interest when pursuing the criminal prosecution. (Id. at 802-814.)  The court explained: "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice,  not merely to convict. [¶ ...] As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer." (Id., at p. 803, internal citations omitted.) Because of their unique responsibilities, prosecutors are forbidden from holding any interest in the outcome of a prosecution because such interests may well be adverse to his prosecutorial duties. (Id., at pp. 803-805.) “A prosecutor occupies a unique role in our criminal justice system and it is essential that he carry out his duties fairly and impartially.  Where a ... prosecutor ...  also represents an interested party, the possibility that his prosecutorial judgment will be compromised is significant.” (Id. at p. 826 (Powell, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J., joined, conc. in part, diss. in part).)  An interested prosecutor “undermines confidence in the integrity of the criminal proceeding” (id., at p. 810), “creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general” (id., at p. 811), and “calls into question, and therefore requires scrutiny of, the conduct of an entire prosecution, rather than simply a discrete prosecutorial decision.” (Id., at p. 812.)  The court and the public simply “cannot have confidence in a proceeding in which [an interested prosecutor] plays the critical role of preparing and presenting the case for the defendant's guilt.” (Id., at p. 811)
	Although Young “strongly condemned interested counsel serving as ... prosecutors, the Court avoided the necessity of reaching the constitutional issue since it relied upon its inherent supervisory authority in condemning the practice. (Young, 481 U.S. at 809.) Obviously, this does not preclude and probably only foreshadows a constitutional bar with respect to the use of interested ... prosecutors. (Citation.) ... [¶] Numerous cases have either found express due process violations or due process implications relating to the participation of an interested prosecutor. (Citations.) We have no hesitation in concluding that the participation [of an interested] ... prosecutors ... is a violation of the defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as ... Article I, [§] 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. (State v. Eldridge (Tn. Ct. App. 1997) 951 S.W.2d 775, 782; and see Young, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 814-815 (Blackmun, J., conc. [interested prosecutor violates due process]; see also maj. opn. at 481 U.S. p. 808, fn. 19, citing Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. United States (5^th Cir. 1969) 411 F.2d 312, 319 [interested prosecutor violates due process]; and see Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors (1994)  47 Ark. L. Rev. 511, 571-575 [explaining why Young’s exercise of supervisory authority merely foreshadows a constitutional preclusion of interested prosecutors].)^9

^9Similar conclusions have been reached in: Ganger v. Peyton (4th Cir. 1967) 379 F.2d 709, 711-714; People v. Zimmer (1980) 51 N.Y.2d 390, 394-396 [414 N.E.2d 705, 708-709];  Commonwealth v. Tabor (Mass. Supreme Ct. 1978) 384 N.E.2d 190 [376 Mass. 811, 819-820]; Sinclair v. State (1976) 278 Md. 243, 255, fn.8 [363 A.2d 468]; Commonwealth v. Eskridge (1992) 529 Pa. 387, 392 [604 A.2d 700]; Cantrell v. Commonwealth (1985) 229 Va. 387, 394 [329 S.E.2d 22]; State v. Detroit Motors (L. Div. 1960) 163 A. 2d 227 [62 N.J. Super. 386]; State v. Tate (La. Supreme Ct. 1936) 171 So. 108 [185 La. 1006];  In re Ridgely (Del. Supreme Ct. 1954) 106 A. 2d 527, 530-31 [48 Del. 464]; In re Davidson (5th Cir. 1990) 908 F.2d 1249, 1251;and Callahan v. Jones (Wash. Supreme Ct. 1939) 93 P.2d 326 [200 Wash. 241].

	The reasoning and holdings of these cases are not limited to situations where the prosecutor simultaneously represents a private party. Young “was especially concerned not only with the conflicting roles of prosecutor and private counsel, but also with the fact that any potential interests of or relationships between the prosecutor and a criminal defendant might compromise the fundamental integrity of the prosecutorial function. ... Indeed, [Young] has become the leading case on general matters of a prosecutor's conflict of interest ....” (New Jersey v. Imperiale (Dist. of NJ 1991) 773 F. Supp. 747, 752.)  Although Young specifically declined to reach the due process issue, “the strong language and reasoning of [Young] ... focus[es] on the prosecutorial function and potential conflict of interests, concerns which are equally at issue in due process challenges to the fundamental fairness of a trial. Thus, [Young] is not only analogous but virtually on point in any criminal case where the ... prosecutor has a personal stake or a conflict of interest.” (Ibid.)
	In Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d 740, the California Supreme Court relied on the same principles discussed in Young to invalidate a contract by which an attorney was hired by a city to prosecute a nuisance abatement action pursuant to a contingency fee contract by which he was to be paid $60.00 per hour for every successful suit, but only $30.00 per hour in cases where the city did not prevail. (39 Cal.3d at p. 745.)  The court recognized that “Clancy has an interest in the result of the case: his hourly rate will double if the City is successful in the litigation.  Obviously this arrangement gives him an interest extraneous to his official function in the actions he prosecutes on behalf of the City.” (Id. at pp. 747-748.)  “It is clear that [case-by-case] fee systems of remuneration for prosecuting attorneys raise serious ethical and perhaps constitutional problems, are totally unacceptable under modern conditions, and should be abolished promptly.” (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 748, internal citations omitted.)  Nuisance abatement actions, like criminal prosecutions, are “a class of civil actions that demands the representative of the government to be absolutely neutral. ” (Id. at p. 748; and see id. at p. 750.) “Any financial arrangement that would tempt the government attorney to tip the scale cannot be tolerated.” (Id. at p. 749; see also Baca v. Padilla (N.M. Supreme Ct. 1920) 190 P. 730, 731-732 [26 N.M. 223] [invalidating contract by which the prosecutor would be paid a “reasonable fee” if the parties he was to prosecute were acquitted, but  if convicted he would receive a "big fee," and finding that such arrangements are “abhorrent to the sense of justice and would not, we believe, be tolerated by any court.”].)
	The City looks to Jerrico, supra, 446 U.S. 238, and contends the City Attorney does not have an improper financial conflict of interest under Chapter 11.94 because, unlike Clancy, nuisance abatement/forfeiture revenue goes to the City Attorney’s Office and Richmond PD and not to deputy City Attorneys and police officers individually. (City’s Brf., 6:1-7:9.)^10 But that has never, in Jerrico or any other case, been the end of the inquiry.  

^10But nothing in Chapter 11.94 prevents forfeiture proceeds from being awarded directly to individual attorneys or police officers, or being used to pay their salaries and benefits, after the proceeds are distributed to the City Attorney’s Office and Richmond PD. Indeed, there are no prohibitions or directives whatsoever with respect to the use of forfeiture proceeds under Chapter 11.94. (Compare H&S §11469; and see fn. 8, ante, p. 14.)

	The California Supreme Court requires prosecutors to be “absolutely” financially neutral (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 748) and thus “[a]ny financial arrangement that would tempt the government attorney to tip the scale [of justice] cannot be tolerated.” (Id. at 749.) To be sure, a direct, personal financial interest will have a particularly strong tendency to imply extraneous motivation, but it does not follow that only evidence of a direct, personal financial interest will support a due process violation. (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at 595.)  “No reason is apparent why a public prosecutor's impartiality could not be impaired by institutional interests, as by personal ones. We have recognized the existence of such an impermissible conflict in a scheme that made the official budget of a public defender dependent on litigation decisions that also affected the interests of the defender's clients (People v. Barboza (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 375, 380); in some circumstances, the same might be true of prosecutors. For example, a scheme that provides monetary rewards to a prosecutorial office might carry the potential impermissibly to skew a prosecutor's exercise of the charging and plea bargaining functions. (Citation.)” (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at 596.)^11

^11Although Eubanks addresses the issue of prosecutorial disqualification under Penal Code section 1424, the standard for finding a disabling conflict of interest is the same under due process. (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at 596 and fn. 8;  Hambarian v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 826, 833, fn. 4; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 43, 86, fn. 12.) In fact, the Massachusetts Supreme Court suggests that Penal Code section 1424's “requirement of a showing of likely prejudice due to a conflict of interest may well impose a burden on a defendant ... that due process considerations do not.” (Commonwealth v. Ellis (Mass. Supreme Ct. 1999) 429 Mass. 362, 367-369, fn. 9 [708 N.E.2d 644, 648-649].)  So if anything, a disabling conflict of interest is more readily shown under due process standards.

	In People v. Barboza, supra, 29 Cal. 3d 375, the court invalidated a scheme where the Public Defender's office was paid a set sum per month and $15,000 was deposited in a reserve account which was required to be maintained at all times to pay “conflicts” counsel when the public defender was disqualified because of a conflict of interest.  The amount of any deficiency in the reserve account was subtracted from the monthly payment due the Public Defender’s office and deposited in the account.  At the end of each fiscal year, any unexpended balance in the reserve account was paid to the Public Defender’s office, and conversely, the Public Defender’s office was liable for any deficiency in the account. (29 Cal.3d at 378-379.)  Pursuant to the contract, the fewer “conflicts” attorneys that were engaged, the  more money was available for the operation of the Public Defender's office.  “The direct consequence of this arrangement was a financial disincentive for the public defender either to investigate or declare the existence of actual or potential conflicts of interest requiring the employment of [conflict] counsel.” (Id. at 379.)  The Public Defender and his deputies were confronted with competing considerations: discovery of any conflicts versus protection of the office’s financial self-interest. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court found “significance” in Jerrico, supra, 446 U.S. 238, and after discussing the facts of that case concluded the danger of prejudice from the contractual arrangement in Barboza “is not so tenuous” as that arising from the statutory scheme in Jerrico, because “the public defender's income and office budget are directly affected by his determination of whether or not a conflict of interest exists.” (Id. at 380, bold added.) “No matter how well-intentioned the public defender might be, the contract places him in a situation with grave consequences and implications for  the administration of justice.  Not only is there an ‘appearance of impropriety,’ there is also a real and insoluble tension, created by the contract, between the defender's conflicting interests.” (Id. at 380.)  
	In Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th 580, the Supreme Court held that the reasoning of Barboza may apply equally to prosecutors and therefore an impermissible conflict arises from a scheme that makes the official budget of a prosecutor dependent on litigation decisions that also affect the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion. (14 Cal.4th at 595-596.) After reciting the prosecutor’s duty of impartiality (id., at 588-594), the court concluded a $13,000 payment by the alleged corporate victim of trade secrets theft to the district attorney’s office to cover the cost of the district attorney's investigation created an impermissible financial conflict of interest which required disqualification.  (Id., at 594-600; and see id., at 600-604 (George, C.J., joined by Mosk, J., conc.).)
	Similarly, in Wilson v. New Orleans (La. Supreme Ct. 1985) 479 So.2d 891, 899, 901-902, the Supreme Court of Louisiana struck down a system where a private company which administered a parking enforcement program, including “booting” vehicles of parking violators, received a commission on the fines collected, even though no employee personally profited.  The private company acted in a prosecutorial, not adjudicative, roll because vehicle owners were able to contest the propriety of the “boot” in court. (Id. at 898-899.)  The court noted the record contained no evidence of wrongdoing or prejudice to the plaintiff, but held no such showing was required because the “financial interest disqualifies [the company] as a neutral and detached decision maker” and “necessarily involves a lack of due process.” (Id., at 901-902.)  
	Of the same ilk is Hubbell, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport (Conn.Sup. Ct. 1996) 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 281, where the city's tax assessor hired a private firm to review and reassess the personal property taxes owed by taxpayers, and the private firm received a percentage of any increased taxes that were imposed and collected.  The private firm reviewed the personal property taxes paid by Hubbell and substantially increased the taxes owed.  The court found the increase factually unsustainable in large part because the private firm’s financial interest was “so evident that the evidence and testimony it presented is not worthy of belief.”  In a footnote, the court also concludes the financial arrangement violates due process by vesting the private firm – who was, in essence, acting as the de facto tax assessor – with a pecuniary interest in the enforcement process. (1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 281, *14-*15, fn. 8.)  As in Wilson, the private firm in Hubbell acted in a prosecutorial, not adjudicative, roll because it assessed taxes while the court determined the propriety of the assessments. (Ibid.)  And as in Wilson, no individual employee directly profited. 
	The reasoning of Barboza, Eubanks, Wilson, and Hubbell follows directly from the due process standard applicable to adjudicators, who can be disqualified based on their “institutional” financial interests as well as their personal interests.  (Ward v. Village of Monroeville (1972) 409 U.S. 57 [34 L. Ed. 2d 267, 93 S. Ct. 80]; United Church of the Medical Center v. Medical Center Commission, supra, 689 F.2d 693, 699-701; Salcido v. Woodbury County (N.D. Iowa 2000) 119 F. Supp. 2d 900, 928; Meyer v. Niles Township (N.D. Ill. 1979) 477 F. Supp. 357, 362; Augustus v. Roemer (1991 E.D. LA) 771 F. Supp. 1458, 1472-1473.)  The prevailing rule in such cases is any financial arrangement, whether personal or institutional, that “would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process  of law." (Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510, 532  [71 L. Ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437] [“Tumey”]; and see, generally, Haas, supra, 27 Cal. 4th 1017, 1024-1031.)
	The City points out that in Jerrico, supra, 446 U.S. 238, the court concluded the strict standard of Tumey and Ward does not apply because prosecutors are not judges and perform “no judicial or quasi-judicial functions,” and it is the judge, not the prosecutor, who remains the ultimate arbiter of an action. (446 U.S. at p. 247.)  But Jerrico’s analysis in this regard is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s subsequent recognition in Young that the presence of a neutral judge does not cure the participation of an interested prosecutor because of the myriad of discretionary prosecutorial decisions which occur outside the purview of the court (Young, supra, 481 U.S. at 807- 813; see also Ganger v. Peyton, supra, 379 F. 2d at 711-714), and the fact that “[e]ven if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching disruption of everyday life.”  (Young, supra, 481 U.S. at 814.)^12  “For this reason, we must have assurance that ... [prosecutors] will be guided solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice,” for they act as a critical neutral buffer between “the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation.” (Id. at 814.)  Similarly, our state Supreme Court has held that the prospect of dismissal or acquittal by a neutral judge or jury does not cure the defect inherent when a prosecutor has a financial interest, because the damage arises from having to face an improper arrest, seizure of property and prosecution in the first place. (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 593-594; Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 848-849 (Moreno, J., diss.).)  Moreover, criminal and forfeiture actions are overwhelmingly resolved by plea agreements and settlements, so a judge or jury rarely has an opportunity to scrutinize the financial interest of prosecutors and police.  It is therefore equally as important, if not more so, to have financially disinterested law enforcement officers and prosecutors as a financially disinterested judge. (Policing for Profit, supra, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35, 62 [“in a system where few cases ever go to trial,” in most cases “the integrity of the system depends primarily on the fairness of the law enforcement branch.”]; Ganger v.Peyton, supra, 379 F.2d at 712, fn. 4 [“more people are cleared and released by the police themselves than by the entire legal process of arraignment, preliminary hearing, indictment by the grand jury, and trial”].)

^12A conclusion which directly follows from the recognition in Jerrico that the decision to enforce or not to enforce “may itself result in significant burdens on a defendant or a statutory beneficiary, even if he is ultimately vindicated in an adjudication.” (Jerrico, supra, 446 U.S. at 249.)

	Additionally, in supporting its analysis in Jerrico, the United States Supreme Court said: 
Prosecutors need not be entirely "neutral and detached," cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S., at 62. In an adversary system, they are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the law. (Jerrico, 446 U.S. at p. 247.)

	But our state Supreme Court has rejected the suggestion that this rationale allows for financially interested prosecutors: “While ... [prosecutors do] have a duty of zealous advocacy, ‘both the accused and the public have a legitimate expectation that his zeal . . . will be born of objective and impartial consideration of each individual case.’” (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 590, citation omitted.)  Thus, unlike Jerrico, the California Supreme Court has embraced the strict standards and principles of Tumey and Ward and said that prosecutors must be “absolutely” financially neutral (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 748) and therefore “[a]ny financial arrangement that would tempt the government attorney to tip the scale [of justice] cannot be tolerated” (id., at 749); and has cited Ward and Tumey as examples of situations where prosecutors “can be disqualified for having an interest in the case extraneous to their official function.” (Id. at 747.)  For a court “to provide an effective forum, both the complainant and the defendant must trust the impartiality of the proceedings. To earn that trust, the prosecutor, like the judge, must be impartial.” (State v. Storm, supra, 661 A.2d 790, 795, bold added.) This is so because “the prosecuting attorney is an officer of the court, holding a quasi judicial position.  His primary responsibility is essentially judicial – the prosecution of the guilty and the protection of the innocent.” (Ganger v. Peyton, supra, 379 F. 2d 709, 714, bold added, cited and quoted with approval in Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 596.)  And “the slightest pecuniary interest of any officer, judicial or quasi-judicial, in the resolving of the subject matter which he [is] to decide," is constitutionally disqualifying. (Tumey, supra, 273 U.S. 524, bold added.)
	And even if Jerrico controls, the City is no better off, because although Jerrico rejected the application to prosecutors of the strict standard set forth in Tumey and Ward, it emphasized that prosecutors are still bound by due process limitations on financial conflicts of interests:
We do not suggest ... that the Due Process Clause imposes no limits on the partisanship of administrative prosecutors.  Prosecutors are also public officials; they, too, must serve the public interest .... A scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts raise serious constitutional questions. (446 U.S. at 250 [internal citations and footnotes omitted, bold added].)

	In Young, the High Court explained that although the federal standard for finding a conflict of interest may differ slightly with respect to judges and prosecutors, “this difference in treatment is relevant to whether a conflict is found, ... not to its gravity once identified.” (Young, supra, 481 U.S. at 810-811.)  Once a court concludes a prosecutor is “subject to influences that undermine confidence that a prosecution can be conducted in disinterested fashion,” the court “cannot have confidence in a proceeding in which [the prosecutor] plays the critical role of preparing and presenting the case for the defendant’s guilt.” (Ibid.)	Accordingly, regardless of whether the court applies the strict standard of “absolute” financial impartiality called for by Clancy or the slightly less stringent standard of Jerrico, it should conclude the incentive for the Richmond PD and City Attorney to supplement their budgets through forfeiture violates due process by injecting a financial interests into the enforcement process (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 595-596, citing Jerrico, supra, 446 U.S. at 250) which carries a significant potential for “devastating” government abuse. (Libretti v. United States (1995) 516 U.S. 29, 43 [133 L. Ed. 2d 271, 116 S. Ct. 356] [“Libretti”].)
	In considering the existence of a constitutionally disqualifying conflict of interest, the court not only looks to the financial interest of the City Attorney himself, but also to the financial interests of the Richmond PD with whom he must interact and on whom he must rely in order to effectively prosecute forfeiture actions. ( People v. Parmar (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 781, 795-797; Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 590, 596; and id. at 601-603 (George, C.J., conc.); Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th 826, 837-838; and id., at 849-852 (Moreno, J., diss.).)  “[A] prosecutor may have a conflict if institutional arrangements link the prosecutor too closely to [another] party ... who in turn has a personal interest in the defendant's prosecution and conviction. ... The tie that binds the prosecutor to an interested [third party] may be compelling though it derives from the prosecutor's institutional objectives or obligations. A public prosecutor must not be in a position of ‘attempting at once to serve two masters,’ the People at large and [another] person or entity with its own particular interests in the prosecution. (Citation.)” (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal. 4th at 596.)^13

^13Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has said “a prosecutor [must] be disinterested in the sense that [he] must not be nor appear to be influenced, in his ... exercise of discretion, either by his ... personal interests or by a person or entity to whom the prosecution of a criminal case will or may bring significant benefits.” (Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, 708 N.E.2d 644, 650.)

	With the additional interests of the Richmond PD in mind, Jerrico is easily distinguishable.
Indeed, what is remarkable about the factors that led Jerrico to conclude the statutory scheme at issue did not violate due process is that in the case of forfeiture under Chapter 11.94, “every one cuts the other way, and to an extreme degree.”  (Policing for Profit, supra, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35, 63; see also id., at p. 66.) As our Supreme Court notes in Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th 580, the outcome in Jerrico is primarily based on the ESA’s unique “budgeting system” which “guarantees there is no ‘realistic possibility’ the prosecuting officer will be influenced by ‘the prospect of institutional gain.’" (Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th 580, 596.)  The danger of prejudice in the instant case is “not so tenuous” (Barboza, supra, 29 Cal. 3d 375, 380-381 [distinguishing Jerrico]) because under Chapter 11.94 revenue is guaranteed to be in addition to the City Attorney’s and Richmond PD’s general budgetary allocations (§11.94.100, subd. (4)); and thus the challenged provisions of RMC §11.94.100 were intended to and do actually result in an increase in the funds available to the Richmond PD and City Attorney over the amount appropriated by federal, state and local governments. (Compare Jerrico, supra, 446 U.S. at 246, 250-252.)^14 

^14The City disingenuously attempts to subdivide the City Attorney’s Office so that it may argue that the City Attorney’s Office “as a whole,” like the Department of Labor in Jerrico, receives forfeiture revenue, while the “the forfeiture division of the City Attorney’s Office,” like the branch offices of the Department of Labor in Jerrico, does not benefit directly.  (City’s Brf. 7:3-7.)  There is no separate “forfeiture division” of the City’s Attorney’s Office under the Richmond City Charter or Chapter 11.94 and the City has presented no evidence, subject to judicial notice, which establishes otherwise. The City Attorney’s Office is not a governmental entity with national or state-wide jurisdiction for which branch or satellite offices are necessary.  Indeed, the City Attorney does not even have a “branch” office in Richmond – his only office is located at 1401 Marina Way South.  While certain attorneys within the City Attorney’s Office may be assigned to handle forfeiture actions under Chapter 11.94, they still remain part of the City Attorney’s Office “as a whole” and thus, unlike the branch offices of the Department of Labor, forfeiture revenue flows directly to the office of the prosecuting attorneys under Chapter 11.94. (RMC §11.94.100, subds. (2)-(4).)

	Additionally, unlike Jerrico, the revenue allocated to the prosecutorial and law enforcement agencies from forfeiture is not limited to the costs incurred in investigating or prosecuting the forfeiture actions (RMC §11.94.100, subds. (2) and (3)), so there is a substantial risk that the prosecutorial and law enforcement agencies will improperly make arrests, seize property, pursue criminal and forfeiture prosecutions, and press for convictions and forfeiture judgments as a means to increase the revenue available to them. (Young, supra, 481 U.S. at 805-806; Baca v. Padilla, supra,  190 P. 730, 731-732.) The more vehicles they seize, the more money they get. (Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution (1994) 39 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 [“Runaway Civil Forfeiture”].)  Forfeiture revenue under the Chapter 11.94 is therefore limited only by the energy police and prosecutors are willing to commit to seizing and forfeiting vehicles. (Policing for Profit, supra, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35, 51, 67-70; and see Good Real Property, supra, 510 U.S. 43, 55-56, fn. 2 [discussing DOJ memo encouraging government attorneys to pursue forfeiture to meet the Department’s budget projections].) And because the monetary distribution provisions of RMC §11.94.100 are mandatory, the Richmond PD and City Attorney  are assured that, as in Barboza, supra, 29 Cal. 3d 375, 380-381, and Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th 580, the proceeds from forfeiture will go directly to their agencies such that their budgets are directly affected by the decisions they make. (Compare Jerrico, supra, 446 U.S. 246, 250-252.)^15

^15Although RMC §11.94.100, subdivision (1), provides for the discretionary allocation of forfeiture proceeds to innocent third parties, this does not lessen the pecuniary conflict of interest but instead increases it, because the City Attorney and Richmond PD receive all the proceeds which are not awarded to third parties. (RMC §11.94.100, subds. (1)-(3).)  Thus, the City Attorney’s and Richmond PD’s financial interests are pitted directly against the rights and interests of potentially innocent third parties.  This alone violates due process. (See Barboza, supra, 29 Cal. 3d at 380-381.)

	RMC §11.94.100 creates a contingent fee arrangement in which the City Attorney and Richmond PD are rewarded for seizing and holding vehicles and pressing for forfeiture judgments or monetary settlements in lieu thereof.  Such a contingent fee system “ought never to be permitted” (Price v. Caperton (Ky. App. 1864) 62 Ky. 207, 208) because it injects into the prosecution of a forfeiture case a City Attorney and police officers whose institutional financial interests are at odds with his duty to ensure that justice is done. (Clancy, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 745-749; Baca v. Padilla, supra, 190 P. 730, 731-732.)  The evil created by RMC §11.94.100 is that the City Attorney and the Richmond PD can profit from being overzealous by seizing vehicles, pursuing forfeiture or demanding settlements (or higher settlements) were they otherwise might not, and equally profit from being underzealous by forgoing meritorious forfeiture prosecutions in favor of monetary settlements if such promises greater financial rewards. (Young, supra, 481 U.S. at 805-806; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 553, 594-496 (Brown, J., diss.).)  This is because once a vehicle is seized, a hearing on the merits does not occur for many months, during which time a vehicle is held at the expense of the City Attorney. (RMC §11.94.100, subd.(2).)  The costs of forfeiture, including storage costs, can exceed the value of the vehicle seized (People v. 6344 Skyway Paradise, California, supra, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1034), and the proceeds of forfeiture can be awarded to third parties instead of the City Attorney and Richmond PD (RMC §11.94.100, subd. (1)) –  leaving those agencies without recompense.  As such, the City Attorney has an improper financial incentive to forgo meritorious forfeiture prosecutions and to settle cases early and often in order to generate the most money for the City Attorney’s office and the Richmond PD. (See Young, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 805-806 [interested prosecutor may forgo meritorious criminal action if such course promises financial rewards]; Ganger v. Peyton, supra, 379 F.2d at pp. 711-712 [offer to dismiss criminal charges in exchange for favorable civil settlement]; State v. Eldridge, supra, 951 S.W.2d 775, 783 [same]; Libretti, supra, 516 U.S. 29, 56 (Stevens, J. diss.) [under such a system, it is not unreasonable to believe a defendant can buy prosecutorial leniency]; and see Barboza, supra, 29 Cal. 3d 375, 379-381 [direct conflict between financial benefit to budget and ethical obligations].)^16

^16And see David B. Smith, Cover Story: New Jersey’s Statute Held Unconstitutional: Prosecutors May Not Benefit From Forfeiture Cases, The Champion (Sept./Oct/ 2003) 27 Champion 12 [Appendix D hereto]; Policing for Profit, supra,  65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 35, 70-79; The Next Stage of Forfeiture Reform, 14 Federal Sentencing Reporter No. 2 (2001),  p. 76; Chi, Follow the Money: Getting to the Root of the Problem with Civil Asset Forfeiture in California (2002) 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1635; Runaway Civil Forfeiture, supra, 39 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 41-47.)

	The whole arrangement has about it the air of "let's make a deal." (Runaway Civil Forfeiture, supra, 39 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 45.)  The innocent pay to secure release when they should not have to and the guilty are allowed to secure release when they should not be able to – and either way the City Attorney and Richmond PD profit. This is the antithesis of the City Attorney’s and Richmond PD’s constitutional obligation to ensure that “guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." 
	Ultimately, the financial incentives of RMC §11.94.100 place the prosecutor and police in a no-win situation in which their motivation and judgment will always be questioned.  Regardless of whether a prosecutor or police officer appears to be acting leniently or zealously when offering or pressing for a monetary settlement in lieu of forfeiture or pursuing a forfeiture judgment, or opposing a third party claim for proceeds under RMC §11.94.100, subdivision (1), their actions are always tainted by the potential that they are financially motivated and thus in contravention of the constitutional duty to ensure that justice is done. (Stop Youth Addiction, supra, 17 Cal. 4th 553, 594-596 (Brown, J., diss.); Young, supra, 481 U.S. at 805-806.) Accordingly, RMC §11.94.100 violates due process and the Third Cause of Action states a viable claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.
E. 	The Fourth Cause of Action states a viable claim for relief because when declaring forfeiture by default the City Attorney acts in an adjudicative roll where he has a heightened duty of financial impartiality under both federal and state law.

	The default provisions of RMC § 11.94.090, subdivision (g), violate due process because the City Attorney is not acting in a prosecutorial roll, he is acting in an adjudicative capacity in which he unilaterally decides – without any court involvement whatsoever – that forfeiture by default is factually and legally appropriate, declares a forfeiture, and then determines whether third parties will receive proceeds and, if so, how much, with all remaining proceeds distributed to his office and the Richmond PD. (RMC §11.94.100.) The City Attorney is thus impermissibly acting as the sole decision-maker in a case where he has a direct financial interest. (In re Murchison (1955) 349 U.S. 133 [99 L. Ed. 942, 75 S. Ct. 623]; Medical Center v. Medical Center Commission, supra, 689 F.2d 693, 699-700 [due process offended where property subject to adjudication reverts to the adjudicator following an adverse decision]; Ward, supra, 409 U.S. 57.) The Fourth Cause of Action thus states a valid claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
CONCLUSION
	Based on the foregoing, the Court should overrule the City’s demurrer in its entirety. 
  					Respectfully Submitted,
Date: January 26, 2004		By:____________________________
					     Mark T. Clausen,  
					Attorney for plaintiff Yasmeen Tanzel

PROOF OF SERVICE
	I, the undersigned, do hereby declare:
	I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the above-entitled action.  My business address is 10918 Rio Ruso Drive, Windsor, California, 95492.  On the date indicated below true copies of the attached documents were placed in a sealed envelope, postage prepaid, and deposited in the United States Mail, address as follows:
WAYNE NISHIOKA, Acting City Attorney	ATTORNEYS FOR CITY OF RICHMOND
BRUCE SOUBLET, Asst. City Attorney
1401 Marina Way South
Post Office Box 4046
Richmond, California 94804	

	I declare that the foregoing is true and correct under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of California.  So declared this _____ day of January, 2004, at Santa Rosa, California.
____________________________
Mark Clausen

-  -

--