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Asset Forfeiture: What to do when police seize your property explains in detail the federal forfeiture process – civil and criminal. It tells how to qualify for a court-appointed attorney, and what to do if you are forced to represent yourself. The book is outlined in a simple question and answer format, with citations to statutes and cases, including links to FEAR's law library and other free internet resources for legal research. It includes a link to a step-by-step video which explains how to prepare a Claim and Answer. Every forfeiture victim needs this book. Criminal defense lawyers need it too, to avoid giving incorrect advice to their clients faced with forfeiture proceedings. Asset forfeiture has risen from an obscure concept in the mid-1980s to a whopping profit-making industry for law enforcement agencies. Over 400 federal statues now trigger forfeiture, and every state has its own statutes as well. These statutes allow police to seize property - not just from criminal defendants, but from third parties such as parents, spouses, landlords, and lien-holders. Because there is no requirement that anyone be charged, much less convicted, large numbers of forfeiture cases are not even connected to a criminal proceeding. The Appendix contains the complete text of several of the most important forfeiture procedural statute. These procedures are explained in the text, with links to the statutes. Buy it now for only $5.99!

Alabama Court of Civil Appeals voids federal forfeiture: state court retains exclusive jurisdiction of property transferred through “adoptive seizures.”  

On September 16, 2011, the Alabama appeals court invoked exclusive state court jurisdiction in holding that, because at the time claimants filed their motion for return of the seized property in the state trial court, “the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the currency, thereby excluding the DEA from exercising jurisdiction.”  In Green v. City of Montgomery, rather than responding to the claimants’ motion to return the $32,353 in seized cash or filing a state forfeiture proceeding, the City’s law enforcement agents asked the federal Drug Enforcement Agency to adopt the seizure. Pursuant to the typical “adoptive seizure” agreement, whereby the City would receive 80% of the forfeited money and the DEA would retain 20% as a fee, the City of Montgomery transferred the seized currency to the DEA.

The City removed the claimants’ motion for return of property to federal court to address claimants’ Fourteenth Amendment claim. While the case was still in federal district court the claimants were notified of the DEA administrative forfeiture proceeding and made no response. The DEA then deposited the seized money into the federal Asset Forfeiture Fund.

The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court’s forfeiture judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the claimants. The appeals court held that when the claimants filed their complaint in the state trial court, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the currency, thereby excluding the DEA from exercising jurisdiction:

Because the trial court had jurisdiction over the currency, and because concurrent jurisdiction over the currency is prohibited, any attempted forfeiture proceeding conducted by the DEA was ineffectual. Therefore, the trial court could not have relied on the administrative-forfeiture proceeding conducted by the DEA to determine that the currency had been forfeited.

The appellate court also agreed with claimants that the trial court erred by not returning the currency because the State failed to promptly institute forfeiture proceedings pursuant to state law.  

Because the DEA did not have jurisdiction over the currency when it attempted to conduct administrative-forfeiture proceedings, and because the State did not promptly file a forfeiture proceeding in state court related to the currency, the claimants are entitled to a return of the currency. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause to that court with instructions to enter a judgment in favor of the claimants.

 Northern California federal district court Judge Marilyn Patel presented an excellent detailed discussion about the exclusive nature of in rem jurisdiction in a 2003 case where Humboldt County law enforcement refused to obey a state court order to return an ounce of marijuana seized from a qualified California medical marijuana patient. Humboldt County Sheriff Dennis Lewis defied the state court order, claiming it would be against federal law for his department to return the marijuana. In Re The Matter of the Seizure of Approximately 28 Grams of Marijuana points to a 1935 Supreme Court case for the long recognized authority that

in suits which are in rem or quasi in rem--where control of the res at issue is essential to the court's jurisdiction--exclusive jurisdiction in one court is necessary in order "to avoid unseemly and disastrous conflicts in the administration of our dual judicial system ... and to protect the judicial processes of the court first assuming jurisdiction." Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S. 189, 195, 79 L. Ed. 850, 55 S. Ct. 386 (1935) (citations omitted). The Court has therefore ruled that "the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other." n3 Id.

The state of California never commenced a forfeiture action against the 28 Grams of Marijuana. There claimant Giauque argued that the Humboldt County Court exercised in rem jurisdiction over the marijuana by holding it as evidence during his criminal trial. The federal district court therefore considered whether the seizure itself or the state court's order to return the marijuana to claimant Christopher Giauque constitute a level of exclusive control over the marijuana that would bar federal proceedings under Penn General:

Even in the absence of a state forfeiture action, courts have found that in some cases, the principles articulated in Penn General bar federal in rem proceedings against property seized by police pursuant to state court warrants. See, e.g., United States v. $ 506.231, 125 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 1997); Scarabin v. DEA, 966 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1992). Courts to apply Penn General in this context have done so based on state statutes governing custody of property seized by police. Where state statutes place items seized by local law enforcement under judicial control, courts have held that seizure by police itself constitutes an assertion of jurisdiction over the seized items by the state courts. See Scarabin, supra (finding that state law granted courts exclusive control over res where statute provided that seized property "shall be retained under the direction of the judge" and, when no longer needed, "shall be disposed of according to law, under the direction of the judge"); United States v. $ 490,920 in United States Currency, 911 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding statute provided in rem jurisdiction where statute and case law provided that seized items be held "in the custody of the court"); Commonwealth v. Rufo, 429 Mass. 380, 708 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Mass. 1999) (suggesting that seizure pursuant to warrant constituted assertion of jurisdiction under statute that provided seized evidence be held "under the direct and control of the court" and "disposed of as the court or justice orders"); Johnson v. Johnson, 849 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Alaska 1993) (search warrant conferred jurisdiction over seized currency to the exclusion of federal jurisdiction under statute requiring peace officer to bring all seized property before judge).

Judge Patel observed that federal courts have not universally found that seizure by state authorities alone blocks federal in rem jurisdiction over the seized property, noting that a number of courts have allowed federal forfeiture actions to proceed against property seized by state police officers so long as no state forfeiture action was pending. (Citing United States v. One 1986 Chevrolet Van, 927 F.2d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1991); Madewell v. Downs, 68 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 1995);  and United States v. $639,470 U.S. Currency, 919 F. Supp. 1405 (C.D. Cal. 1996).)

The In Re 28 Grams court found that California law requires the seizing law enforcement officer to retain custody of seized property, subject to the order of the state court.

By seizing the marijuana from the Sheriff, federal law enforcement necessarily contravened the orders of a state court disposing of property under its control. Federal authorities may not "muscle in" on state proceedings in order to gain control over property seized by state police. See $506,231, 125 F.3d at 450. When federal authorities seek to gain control over a res already in the control of a state court, the proper procedure is to seek turnover order from that court. Id. Federal courts cannot bypass state laws giving seized property into the exclusive control of state courts by "trumping" the state court's jurisdiction--such is precisely the unseemly conflict between judicial systems that Penn General sought to avoid.
 

While a portion of Judge Patel’s decision relies on California law governing the chain of custody of property seized pursuant to a state court warrant, much of the reasoning set forth by the In Re 28 Grams court applies to any federal adoption of state asset seizures where the state court does not issue an order relinquishing its own exclusive jurisdiction. Judge Patel cites case law from the Supreme Court and multiple federal circuits, including a lengthy discussion of the relationship of in rem proceedings to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a judicial doctrine based upon the principle that federal district courts are courts of original jurisdiction, and therefore lack jurisdiction to review the decisions of a state judicial process.

Judge Patel concluded:

Because this court finds that it would not have jurisdiction in forfeiture proceedings against the subject marijuana and that it therefore improperly issued the seizure warrant, the DEA is ORDERED to return the subject marijuana to the Humboldt County Sheriff's Department and the state court that asserted jurisdiction over it. Further proceedings as to the legality of its return to Giauque should be taken up in state court.

FEAR’s Brenda Grantland explained the recent Alabama appeals court decision:

A fundamental principle of in rem cases is that once one court asserts in rem jurisdiction over a particular property, that jurisdiction is exclusive and no other court may assert jurisdiction until the first court releases the property from its jurisdiction.

The [Green v. City of Montgomery] court held the DEA administrative forfeiture was void and the claimant's default had no effect. And, since the state had defaulted in the lower court proceedings, the Alabama appeals court ruled in favor of the claimants. This is the same game of keep-away that the state agents and feds played in a California case I won this summer, in which the feds had to give back $2 million plus interest.

Brenda’s successful Motion for the Temporary Restraining Order that resulted in the federal government having to return $2 million plus interest is one of the many useful pleadings available in FEAR’s Brief Bank.

Audit of U.S. Marshals Service Asset Forfeiture Division's Complex Asset Team: Audit by the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reveals mismanagement, failure to keep records, lack of oversight, inadequate procedures and disregard for requirements set forth in the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual.

We've seen far too many examples of local sheriffs and district attorneys pursuing funding for their agencies by running rough shod over travelers passing through their little fiefdoms, then spending the loot willy nilly on themselves. Now a September 2011 Audit by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General shows a similar concentration of power and unsupervised mismanagement at the federal level.  The Audit of the United States Marshals Service Complex Asset Team Management and Oversight was triggered by the Office of Inspector General's investigation into Complex Asset Team leader Leonard Briskman regarding an allegation of a conflict of interest.  For five years as an employee of the U.S. Marshals Service Asset Forfeiture Division, Briskman appraised the value of complex assets seized by the government and arranged for buyers of those assets while owning and running his own private appraisal business.

Briskman's conflict of Interest
According to the OIG audit, the "investigation did not substantiate" the allegation made against Briskman, "but concerns about potential irregularities in the USMS’s management of complex assets prompted the OIG to conduct this audit of Complex Asset Team operations between 2005 and 2010" – the five-year period beginning in January 2005 when Briskman started his private asset valuation business and April 2010 when the USMS transferred Briskman out of the Complex Asset Team.

Lack of oversight
From its inception in 1998 until 2003 the Complex Asset Team consisted only of Briskman, with the number of his staff between 2004 and March 2011 varying between two to four members – without any oversight as to how or why the "Team" reached decisions regarding pre-seizure planning, valuation and sales of complex assets restrained, seized or forfeited by the government.

Lack of pre-seizure planning to avoid protracted litigation against innocent third parties
The OIG Audit determined that because the Complex Asset Team has not instituted pre-seizure planning procedures, which could have avoided unnecessary risk of "becoming involved in protracted litigation" against third parties with interests in the seized assets, "the government has assumed responsibility for assets with significant liabilities that constrain the ability of the government to dispose of those assets." (Of course, though unmentioned in the audit, this lack of pre-seizure planning also constrains those innocent third parties with interests in seized assets from using or disposing of their interest in seized assets without "becoming involved in protracted litigation.")

Scant record keeping with little or no oversight

The audit also found that

the Complex Asset Team did not consistently track and document how assets it was responsible for were managed, appraised, and disposed. The Complex Asset Team provided us a list of 55 assets it disposed of between 2005 and 2010. The final values listed for each asset ranged from $1 to $49 million. Our review of this list revealed at least eight assets for which the ultimate purchaser or the final sale price was not recorded. Further, of the 55 disposed complex assets listed, we were able to locate corresponding files for only 47 of the assets. Additionally, our file review identified files related to 35 additional assets that were not detailed on a Complex Asset Team inventory of all assets.

Further, we found the Complex Asset Team also lacked procedures to ensure that team members charged with valuing an asset were prevented from also selling the same asset. In multiple instances, Briskman valued and sold the same asset himself, without sufficient supervisory oversight or review by other team members. Additionally, in an effort to simplify the asset disposal process, Briskman did not publicly announce the sale of some complex assets, which we found limited the ability of the general public to purchase assets. Briskman also made these decisions without sufficient oversight by his supervisor. This lack of transparent procedures and oversight in the asset valuation and disposition process caused an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) from the Southern District of New York to lose confidence in the Complex Asset Team’s ability to sell two assets derived from the Bernard Madoff criminal case. ...

Given the deficiencies our audit identified in Complex Asset Team operations, we reviewed the Asset Forfeiture Division’s overall management of the Team. We found that Briskman’s direct supervisor, Assistant Director of the Asset Forfeiture Division Eben Morales, did not implement formal approval structures for decisions involving complex assets, which afforded Briskman the final authority to make significant asset decisions with little or no oversight.

We also determined that Complex Asset Team decisions and operations – specifically those regarding assets restrained instead of formally seized – were not subject to internal or external reviews.

During the time period that Briskman owned his own private appraisal business, his Complex Asset Team disposed of approximately $136 million in assets. The Marshals Service was not able to provide files for 8 of the 55 assets it reported disposed by the Complex Asset Team. Moreover, according to the Asset Forfeiture Program's asset tracking system, during this same time period "the USMS disposed of about 10,000 assets worth over $3.52 billion that would have been categorized as complex assets" under the USMS guidelines. "This means that the Complex Asset Team's asset portfolio constituted just a fraction of the total number of seized or restrained businesses and financial instruments" that USMS policy defines as complex.

The USMS was not able to provide to us asset files for 8 of the 55 assets it reported disposed by the Complex Asset Team between 2005 and 2010. As a part of the audit, we also reviewed documents at USMS headquarters and identified 35 additional files that appeared to be for assets that were not on the Complex Asset Team asset list.5 We subsequently asked Asset Forfeiture Division managers and Complex Asset Team members for any additional information regarding the 35 files identified. To date, the USMS has not provided us information to: (1) explain the disparity between the original inventory of 55 assets and the 35 additional files we found at USMS headquarters or (2) demonstrate that it has properly safeguarded and accounted for assets pertaining to the 35 files we identified.
        We determined that the Complex Asset Team did not maintain a comprehensive log of the requests from USMS district offices, USAOs, and investigative agencies for assistance with assets during the seizure and forfeiture process. We also found that the Complex Asset Team did not maintain organized and complete records of its own activities. As a result, the Complex Asset Team could not determine the extent of its involvement in requests for assistance, nor could the OIG assess the appropriateness of the Team’s asset management decisions.

Conflict of interest where same person assigns value and liquidates the same asset
The OIG audit found that while "adequate internal controls should preclude the same person from both appraising and selling the same asset" in order to avoid a conflict of interest, the Complex Asset Team "did not employ procedures that segregated appraisal duties from selling functions."

On September 1, 2011, the Texas “Act relating to criminal asset forfeiture, the disposition of proceeds and property from criminal asset forfeiture, and accountability for that disposition; providing civil penalties,” went into effect. After hearing stories of Sheriff of Nottingham style highway robberies in Texas, state Senator John Whitmire authored Texas State Senate Bill 316 to end forfeiture “agreements” in which officers intimidate motorists into signing documents purporting to waive all interest and legal rights to seized property – most frequently whatever amount of cash they happen to have been carrying during a traffic stop.

The new law also reins in district attorneys who used asset forfeiture funds as their personal slush funds, placing additional specific spending restrictions for district attorney of the 198^th Judicial District (Kerr, Kimble, Mcculloch, Mason, and Menard Counties). The legislature singled out the office of the 198^th District D.A., by requiring that before that particular district attorney office uses any forfeiture proceeds it must first obtain approval of:

(1)  the commissioners court of each county in the  judicial district; or (2)  a regional review committee composed of three   members who are a county judge, a county attorney, a county   commissioner or a county sheriff, each appointed by the member of  the house of representatives of this state who represents the   largest number of counties in the judicial district.  

Former 198^th District District Attorney Sutton gained widespread criticism for spending asset forfeiture funds taking his wife to Hawaii for a week at a time, and then adding staff and former Judge Emil Karl Prohl to his free vacation trips.  Sutton and Prohl have since been convicted of misappropriating asset forfeiture funds.

Other tales of corruption prompted state Senator Whitmire to introduce SB 316, including: Tenaha, Shelby County DA Linda Kay Russell using money seized from travelers to buy margarita machines; former Jim Wells and Brooks County DA Joe Frank Garza, who was sentenced to six months in jail plus 10 years probation and repayment of $2.1 in restitution, for illegally using over $2 million in asset forfeiture funds to provide cash bonuses to himself and three of his selected employees during his term as district attorney for Brooks and Jim Wells counties from 2002 through 2008. Whitmire also heard accounts from victims of highway robbery who are presently seeking class action status in Morrow v. City of Tehana, case # 2:08-cv-00288.

A few examples from fiefdoms outside of Texas:

As in the days of not-so-merry-old England, tales of corrupt sheriffs who support themselves and their agents by imposing fines and forfeitures within each of their fiefdoms abound. And as agencies grapple with fiscal cuts, the Sheriff of Notingham syndrome has become all the more pervasive.

·       In Kentucky, Nicholas County Sheriff Leonard “Dick” Garrett began trial last month on charges of felony theft and abuse of public trust for illegally taking $43,291 from a forfeiture account and spending more than $10,000 for his personal use. Then, in a surprise move, just as testimony began, Garrett accepted a plea agreement in which he agreed to testify against his co-defendant and resigned from office on August 8. 

·       In Tennessee an investigation by NewsChannel 5 found “case-after-case” of innocent victims stripped of their cash by police addicted to profit:

o   Vietnamese immigrant Van Huynh was on his way back to Texas after traveling to Virginia where he had hoped to pay cash he had saved up for months to purchase his third nail salon. Proud of earning American citizenship in 2006, Huynh thought he had the right to tell police that his plans for the cash he carried was none of their business, and resisted an attempted shakedown by Dickson Interdiction and Criminal Enforcement unit (DICE). The agents handcuffed Huynh and transported him to police headquarters where Dickson County detectives questioned for four hours, demanding that he prove why he was traveling with $50,000 in cash. Huynh was proud of earning American citizenship in 2006, resisted the attempted shakedown.

o   In Decatur County Carmina Perez and her 10-year-old son were on their way to visit family, and freely admitted to interdiction officers that she was carrying $15,000 she had saved to help her family with their medical bills. After four hours calling her a liar on the side of the road the agents seized her savings.

The June 6 NewsChannel 5 article continues:

And she's not alone.

Our NewsChannel 5 investigation found case-after-case where other innocent people also had their cash taken by people who are supposed to be enforcing the law.

Shelby County: Memphis police took $32,000 from an African-American woman -- money she'd been saving for a down payment on a building that she planned to buy the next day. A state administrative law judge later called it "highly inappropriate ... to deprive a citizen of her property based simply on such speculation and  conjecture."

Hamilton County:  A sheriff's deputy seized $28,000 from a Vietnamese businessman -- money that the man had borrowed to buy a restaurant. A judge later ruled that was "not the proceeds from the sale of drugs."

Bradley County:  Police took $20,000 from an African-American man who had won the Georgia Lottery. The man said he had been to Knoxville trying to buy a car. A judge later ruled "there was no proof that Claimant had any connection with illegal drugs."

In another case, police seized $31,000 from a Korean businessman who had collected the money as repayment of a loan. A judge later ruled that "there was no 'reasonable suspicion' or 'probable cause' to make the traffic stop."

Also, in Bradley County, a Tennessee Highway Patrol officer took $1
,504from an African-American businessman who had been using cash to buy flooded properties in New Orleans. The money was returned after the state failed to pursue the case.

Monroe County:  Police confiscated $17,300 from three Hispanic men. They were about to wire the money to family in El Salvador to buy a house. A judge later ruled that "there was absolutely no proof that Claimants sold any drugs."

Sullivan County:  An interdiction team took $27,500 from a Hispanic man. He was transporting the money his mother had saved to Virginia, where she'd moved from California. The state later returned the money to the woman.

Gary Blackburn said those cases show there's something wrong with a system that has officers policing for profit.

"That badge is a testament that you are part of the system to protect people, it is part of the law," he added. "That badge is not a commission to seize money."

NewsChannel 5 Investigates asked Perez, "So how long did it take you to get your money back?"

"It took me about two years," she answered.

As to how many innocent people are searched and detained in the search for cash, no one knows for sure -- since most agencies claim they don't keep such records.

FEAR's Brenda Grantland notes the tendency of asset forfeiture laws to corrupt law enforcement agencies is amply illustrated in Columbia, South America, where according to officials quoted by CBS news,

billions of dollars in drug assets that the government planned to use to benefit crime victims and law enforcement have simply disappeared. The agency itself has been so hampered by misappropriation, mismanagement and maddening legal challenges that President Juan Manuel Santos has decided to scrap it.

Interior Minister German Vargas said a decree dissolving the agency would come soon. That will leave the Finance Ministry with the task of sorting through a list of 95,000 assets to determine what remains, and how much has been plundered and by whom, says the DNE's final director, Juan Carlos Restrepo, whom Santos appointed in October shortly after taking office.

"Supposedly we should have a large amount of jewels, all the Rolex (watches) encrusted with diamonds," Restrepo said, sighing. "But I'll tell you, if ranches have been robbed, why wouldn't a Rolex be pilfered?"

The list of assets includes a $140,000 Ferrari, multimillion-dollar homes, a hotel, small planes, jet skis and paintings by famed Colombian artists.

What is certain, Restrepo and others at DNE say, is that billions of dollars worth of assets have disappeared. Prosecutors will try to determine who took what, and then the Finance Ministry will sell off the remaining assets at auction. The proceeds are supposed to be used to pay reparations to victims of Colombia's long-running internal conflicts, including those forced from their homes and relatives of the more than 50,000 slain.

The total value of the seized assets is unknown, as is the location of numerous properties of drug traffickers. Many have been registered in the names of third parties to confound law enforcement. Some properties have been sacked. Others have fallen into disuse, their value deteriorating.

The DNE "is a place where the worst of the nation is in confluence," Restrepo said. "Corruption and gangsters are there."

The 46-year-old lawyer said that just a few days after his arrival, after a preliminary look at reams of documents, he realized he had come upon "the mother camp, the starship, of corruption."

However, in Maryland a refreshingly honest chief prosecutor in St. Mary responded to budget cuts by eliminating asset seizures. "The constitution requires me to do certain duties. I perform those duties well," Fritz said at his office in the county courthouse. "There's nothing requiring that the state's attorney should be a revenue source for county government."

On August 12, 2011, Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley asked Congress to adopt changes set forth in H.R. 2610, the Asset Forfeiture Fund Reform and Distribution Act of 2011. She also wrote to U.S. Senators expressing her support for Senate Bill 1304, the Fisheries Fee Fairness Act of 2011.  The two bills introduced by Congressman Barney Frank and Senator John Kerry would amend the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which presently authorizes the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to keep and spend the fines and forfeitures it imposes upon the nation’s fishermen.  

Kerry and Frank filed the two NOAA Asset Forfeiture Fund reform bills following an investigation by a federal Inspector General Todd Zinser, which was expanded by retired U.S. Judge Robert B. Swartwood III as a special investigative master appointed by former Commerce Secretary Gary Locke.  Both found that NOAA enforcement agencies engaged in abuse of power and misuse of asset forfeiture funds imposed, collected and spent by each of NOAA’s six Office of Law Enforcement regions.  As U.S. Congressman Walter B. Jones (NC) wrote to NOAA in December 2010, the Inspector General-commissioned audit of NOAA’s asset forfeiture fund

found extensive waste, fraud and abuse by the agency. It also proved what fishermen have long suspected: allowing NOAA Fisheries to retain the proceeds from forfeitures, seizures, fines and penalties against fishermen gives the agency a perverse incentive to continue its abusive enforcement practices against fishermen. This conflict of interest must be eliminated.

Mr. Frank’s bill, H.R. 2610, introduced July 20, 2011, would amend the Magnuson-Stevens Act to reform procedures for spending NOAA’s Asset Forfeiture Fund bill to eliminate the incentive of NOAA law enforcement to levy fines and forfeitures for its own use by distributing those monies to NOAA for high priority stock assessments and to States for fisheries data collection, research, and monitoring.

Both bills would establish a formal process to reimburse fishermen and related businesses for legal fees incurred in successfully challenging enforcement penalties.

On August 17 the Gloucester Times reported that AG Coakley announced in a prepared statement:

The livelihood of fishermen and the economies of our fishing communities have been greatly harmed by the excessive penalties levied by NOAA, and an appeals process that stacked the decks against them. ... These two pieces of legislation are important steps toward restoring fairness and reimbursing our fishermen for the legal fees they incurred while challenging those unfair penalties. I commend Sen. Kerry and Congressman Frank for their leadership on this important issue.

On January 5, 2011, Texas state Senator John Whitmire (D-Houston) filed state Senate Bill 316 “to address the continuing abuse of the asset forfeiture process and misuse of the funds generated by these seizures.”  Senator Whitmire stated, “The criminal convictions of a District Judge and District Attorney last year demonstrate these reforms are required and necessary.” The news release from the Senator’s office announced:

The bill would prevent prosecutors from obtaining a waiver to the rights to seized property until a  suit has been filed and a court begins supervising the process.  No longer will a waiver be allowed after a traffic stop; a practice which has led to allegations of highway robbery where a person is searched and their property seized, but the suspect is never charged with any crime.

The new law will also provide a list of prohibited uses of the proceeds and ensure that only expenditures to fight crime are allowed, the intended purposes for which these actions are designed.

“Without the proper  guidelines and transparency, these events can lead to the  worst case scenario of highway piracy, as we have so painfully  observed in several cases across this state,” stated Senator Whitmire.

Texas Senate Bill 316 would provide reforms similar to legislation introduced by Senator Whitmire in 2009.  According to an ongoing federal civil rights lawsuit filed July 24, 2008, which spurred Senator Whitmire’s 2009 legislative reform effort, Tenaha city police pull over motorists – especially African Americans – and extort money and valuables by threatening criminal charges or worse. According to their Third Amended Complaint, ten Plaintiffs in Morrow v. City of Tenaha Deputy City Marshal Barry Washington et al, Case # 2:08-cv-00288 claim they were intimidated into signing a waiver on the spot to give up all claim to the cash or valuables, such as cell phones and computers, then were allowed to drive away without charges filed. 

The Plaintiffs are also presently seeking certification of a class action on behalf of “similarly situated persons consisting of: (1) people who are, or appeared to be, members of racial or ethnic minority groups and those in their company, and (2) were or will be traveling in, through or near Tenaha since July 27, 2006, and (3) were, or are subject to being,  stopped and detained and/or arrested by one or more of the Defendants without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity, to find valuable property or money.”

In her February 2009 article, “Property seizure by police called ‘highway priacy’,”  Lisa Sandberg reported for the Houston Chronicle:

Law enforcement authorities in this East Texas town of 1,000 people seized property from at least 140 motorists between 2006 and 2008, and, to date, filed criminal charges against fewer than half, according to a San Antonio Express-News review of court documents.

Virtually anything of value was up for grabs: cash, cell phones, personal jewelry, a pair of sneakers, and often, the very car that was being driven through town. Some affidavits filed by officers relied on the presence of seemingly innocuous property as the only evidence that a crime had occurred.

Linda Dorman, a great-grandmother from Akron, Ohio, had $4,000 in cash taken from her by local authorities when she was stopped while driving through town after visiting Houston in April 2007. Court records make no mention that anything illegal was found in her van and show no criminal charges filed in the case. She is still waiting for the return of what she calls “her life savings.”

Dorman’s attorney, David Guillory, calls the roadside stops and seizures in Tenaha “highway piracy,” undertaken by a couple of law enforcement officers whose agencies get to keep most of what is seized.

Los Angeles Times reporter Howard Witt wrote that in Tenaha, Texas:

You can drive into this dusty fleck of a town near the Texas-Louisiana state line if you're African American, but you might not be able to drive out of it – at least not with your car, your cash, your jewelry or other valuables.

That's because the police here allegedly have found a way to strip motorists, many of them black, of their property without ever charging them with a crime. Instead they offer out-of-towners a grim choice: Sign over your belongings to the town, or face felony charges of money laundering or other serious crimes.

More than 140 people reluctantly accepted that deal from June 2006 to June 2008, according to court records. Among them were a black grandmother from Akron, Ohio, who surrendered $4,000 in cash after Tenaha police pulled her over, and an interracial couple from Houston, who gave up more than $6,000 after police threatened to seize their children and put them into foster care, the court documents show. Neither the grandmother nor the couple were charged with or convicted of any crime. ...

The property seizures are not happening just in Tenaha. In southern parts of Texas near the Mexican border, for example, Latinos allege that they are being singled out. ...

David Guillory, an attorney in nearby Nacogdoches who filed the federal lawsuit, said he combed through Shelby County court records from 2006 to 2008 and discovered nearly 200 cases in which Tenaha police seized cash and property from motorists. In about 50 of the cases, suspects were charged with drug possession.

But in 147 others, Guillory said the court records showed, the police seized cash, jewelry, cellphones and sometimes even automobiles from motorists but never found any contraband or charged them with any crime. Of those, Guillory said he managed to contact 40 of the motorists directly – and discovered that all but one of them were black.

“The whole thing is disproportionately targeted toward minorities, particularly African Americans,” Guillory said. “Every one of these people is pulled over and told they did something, like, ‘You drove too close to the white line.’ That's not in the penal code, but it sounds plausible. None of these people have been charged with a crime; none were engaged in anything that looked criminal. The sole factor is that they had something that looked valuable.” ...

Once the motorists were detained, the police and the Shelby County district attorney quickly drew up legal papers presenting them with an option: Waive their rights to their cash and property or face felony charges for crimes such as money laundering –  and the prospect of having to hire a lawyer and return to Shelby County multiple times to contest the charges in court.  ...

The process apparently is so routine in Tenaha that Guillory discovered pre-signed and pre-notarized police affidavits with blank spaces left for an officer to fill in a description of the property being seized.

Jennifer Boatright, her husband and two young children -- a mixed-race family – were traveling from Houston to visit relatives in East Texas in April 2007 when Tenaha police pulled them over, alleging that they were driving in a left-turn lane.

After searching the car, the officers discovered what Boatright said was a gift for her sister: a small, unused glass pipe made for smoking marijuana. Although they found no drugs or other contraband, the police seized $6,037 that Boatright said the family was carrying to purchase a used car – and then threatened to turn their children, ages 10 and 1, over to Child Protective Services if the couple didn't agree to sign over their right to their cash.

“It was give them the money or they were taking our kids,” Boatright said. “They suggested that we never bring it up again. We figured we better give them our cash and get the hell out of there.”

Several months later, after Boatright and her husband contacted an attorney, Tenaha officials returned their money but offered no explanation or apology. The couple remain plaintiffs in the federal lawsuit.

Stating that he doesn’t need to await the suit’s outcome to try to fix what he regards as a statewide problem, in 2009 Senator Whitmire introduced a forfeiture reform bill that would have required police to go before a judge before attempting to seize property under the asset-forfeiture law.  In a May 12, 2009 NPR “All Things Considered” interview, Whitmire said that he was leading the reform effort in the Texas legislature because:

“I thought they were robbing people. I don’t know how else you can describe it. You know, when you pull someone over and search their automobile, district attorney finds cash and they take it, and allow them to sign a waiver if they leave the state and not come back. I mean, that’s just highway robbery, as far as I'm concerned. No charge has ever been filed.”

“The law has gotten away from what was intended, which was to take the profits of a bad guy’s crime spree and use it for additional crime fighting,” Whitmire told the Times. “Now it’s largely being used to pay police salaries – and it’s being abused because you don't even have to be a bad guy to lose your property.”

“Ultimately,” reported the L.A. Times, Senator Whitmire hopes to tighten the law further so that law-enforcement officials will be allowed to seize property only after a suspect is charged and convicted in a court.”  However, Senator Whitmire’s 2009 reform effort fell short of becoming law.  Therefore, Whitmire renewed his effort to enact a first step toward Texas forfeiture law reform by filing the 2011 Texas Senate Bill 316.  In addition to prohibiting roadside “waiver agreements,” SB 316 would also impose some process and oversight regarding police expenditures of forfeiture proceeds.

Senator Whitmire’s proposed asset forfeiture fund spending restrictions address the strong public criticism of how Texas law enforcers have been spending the proceeds from the assets they seize and prosecute.  For example, as John Burnett reported for NPR News, Austin:

“Former District Attorney Ron Sutton spent $27,000 in forfeiture funds to take his whole office, plus the district judge, to Hawaii for a judicial conference. Sutton says it was a legitimate criminal justice conference, and he never spent forfeiture funds that were not approved.”

Former Kimble County DA Sutton, Kimble interjected: “I did absolutely nothing wrong. And every time we had a conference anywhere that was of benefit to me, the judge approved the check.”

Congressman to NOAA: “allowing NOAA Fisheries to retain the proceeds from forfeitures, seizures, fines and penalties against fishermen gives the agency a perverse incentive to continue its abusive enforcement practices against fishermen. ... It is extremely troubling that the agency’s draft policy would allow fines, penalties and forfeitures from fishermen to be used to pay the salaries of the Administrative Law Judges.”

Former federal agent exposes Asset Forfeiture Fund corruption, files whistleblower suit against U.S. Marshals Service 

Springer versus eleven IRS special agents

Forfeiture 101 is here! Announcing the release of the first in a series of  FEAR's clear, concise and informative DVD courses on substantive forfeiture law and procedure.

Forfeiture 101 is a Continuing Legal Education DVD course that enables defense attorneys to effectively expand their practices to meet the needs of the vastly increasing number of victims of the government's ever-broadening overreach for assets and money judgments.

Lawyers taking on their first forfeiture case suddenly find that law school never prepared them for the maze of complex proceedings that strictly adhere to Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions, further complicated by CAFRA reforms that apply to some forfeiture proceedings and not to others. Forfeiture victims will find this DVD to be a  godsend – especially those forced to represent themselves because they can't afford counsel. This entertaining and informative two-hour DVD serves as a crash (or refresher) course in forfeiture law, as well as an interactive computer research tool.  Pop the DVD in your computer and click the menu for the chapter you need to research. As you listen to a narrative overview of the issues, you can pause at any time and note the case and statute citations that appear on the screen accompanying the narration. Forfeiture 101 is the first in a series of  FEAR's clear, concise and informative DVD courses on substantive forfeiture law and procedure. FEAR's Forfeiture 101: Chapter 1: Dangerous Misconceptions About Forfeiture Chapter 2: Historical Origins of Forfeiture's Quirky Procedures Chapter 3: The Ever-Growing Number of Forfeiture Laws Chapter 4: Defenses Against Forfeiture Chapter 5: Which Track: Civil or Criminal Forfeiture? Chapter 6: Civil Forfeiture: A Torturous, Treacherous Trail Chapter 7: A Fork in the Path:  CAFRA or Customs Procedures? Chapter 8: An Alternate Route: Criminal Forfeiture   © 2009

Or save even more with FEAR's special introductory forfeiture package deal: Forfeiture 101 DVD with Asset Forfeiture Defense Manual, plus a one-year subscription to FEAR's Brief Bank for only $300 plus $12 shipping. (Applicable sales tax will be added to California orders).

The Sheriff of Nottingham Syndrome    by Judy Osburn

Whether the legends of Robin Hood come to us as a composite of popular English heroes, or the character who fights oppression and injustice arises from pure myth, the central villains of Robin Hood fame existed in real life, and their infamy changed the course of history.

The sinister Prince John of Robin Hood legend became King John in 1199.  His reign became so oppressive that his kingdom nearly erupted into full scale civil war.  In 1215 the barons of England forced King John to put his seal on the Magna Carta—the first time history that an English king became subject to the laws of his kingdom.  

However, early stories of Robin Hood refer to the principal villain not by name, but simply as “the Sheriff of Nottingham.”  The sheriff's office and his position as corrupt local authority are central to the Robin Hood legend.  The Sheriff of Nottingham is likely a composite of many accounts of abusive sheriffs of the period.  ...

The Sheriff's word was law across Nottinghamshire during the legendary time of Robin Hood. Sheriffs throughout England were appointed, but not paid, by the king. The annual fee that each sheriff had to pay the king to keep his office was called the "farm" of the county.  The sheriffs usually made far more than the crown asked for by collecting taxes and seizing property from anybody who they cared to label “outlaw.” 

In 1204, King John said the sheriffs weren't expected to keep any of the county's revenue. That mattered little because the sheriffs didn't report all of their income, especially from such sources as being bribed to look the other way, arranging false arrests, roadside search and seizures, and so on. ... Robin Hood historians say that perhaps tales of many corrupt sheriffs combined to make the nameless adversary of Robin Hood. ...

... The Sherriff of Nottingham's system of policing for profit was open to much abuse. Likewise, modern accounts of corruptoin fueled by police agencies' ever increasing dependence on forfeiture revenue abound accross the nation. ...

... Like the Sheriff of Nottingham, the word of police became law across Bradenton, Florida. ...

... Just as the sheriffs of old England, in Indiana the Muncie-Delaware County Drug Task Force didn't report all of their income from assets funneled through confidential agreements. ...

... almost $66,000 was discovered secreted in the former headquarters of the Western Area Narcotics Task Force (WANT) in Paducah, Kentucky. An inquiry followed to determine where the money came from and figure out what to do with it. Investigators learned that the task force had seized large amounts of money which it then used for whatever purposes it wished, unconstrained by audits, reporting requirements or its mission. This problem is endemic to forfeiture beneficiaries, from the Justice Department on down. ... Both seizures and expenditures were largely lawless. Like other task forces, WANT made asset seizures a priority, and mandated expected forfeiture growth rates. But WANT met its quotas with much more zeal than care. ...

... Police pirates’ ever-increasing reliance on seizing plunder for their agencies results in a perversion of law enforcement priorities. ... The North Central Texas Narcotics Task Force struck deals with ... criminals [who] each received sentences of probation in exchange for not contesting the forfeiture of assets used to fund the task force. Denver McCarty, a former task force prosecutor, said he offered the deals to a half-dozen defendants during the last two years because the task force needed the money to stay in business. "If we don't have enough money by the end of the grant year, we're all out of a job," he said. "You kind of knew what kind of forfeiture money you needed to have, or everybody's going home."  ...

Full article at www.fear.org/police.html


Also see Austin-based writer Jan Reid's  “Highway Robbery—One man's painful journey through South Texas' addiction to asset forfeiture,” a detailed account of  “agreed judgments, ” by which South Texas police, “working the traffic on U.S. 281 and finding reasons to search cars and trucks, ” intimidate travelers into forfeiting all rights to contest the seizure of any currency they have with them.  (May 16, 2008 edition of the Texas Observer.)

• educating judges, court clerks, and criminal defense attorneys about forfeiture claimants' statutory right to counsel;

• andproviding research materials and the nation's only fofeiture training program for criminal defense attorneys and pro-se lititgants which will be made available at low cost to participants.

Nearly eight years after CAFRA's right to counsel provisions took effect, Attorney John Balazs and his clients Rollie and Scharlynn Trout blaze the first trail establishing an appointment of counsel process for owners whose primary residence has been seized.

Former U.S. Representative Henry J. Hyde (R., Ill.), died in his sleep at age 83 in the early morning Thursday, November 29, 2007, at Rush University Medical Center in Chicago.  We at FEAR will dearly miss this courageous, powerful man who made clear exactly "what is at stake in the issues surrounding civil forfeiture law: no less than the most fundamental rights American citizens have always cherished, but too often taken for granted.”  Henry Hyde retired from Congress in January after spending three decades as a moving force on Capital Hill.  Representative Hyde sponsored our nation’s only federal forfeiture law reform, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).  The powerful chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, waged "a war of attrition with the Department of Justice and local law-enforcement authorities" to get CAFRA enacted –  the culmination of his seven-year crusade. Representative Hyde's well-documented 1995 book, Forfeiting Our Property Rights, revealed the “the hoary doctrines of Anglo-American civil asset forfeiture law that have been resurrected like some jurisprudential Frankenstein monster, from the dark recesses of past centuries.”  His introductory chapter continues: “In my view, a drug ‘war’ has been perverted too often into a series of frontal attacks on basic American constitutional guarantees – including due process, the presumption of innocence, and…unrelenting government assaults on property rights, fueled by a dangerous and emotional vigilante mentality that sanctions shredding the U.S. Constitution into meaningless confetti.” Although most known for the Hyde Amendment that banned federal funds for abortions in 1976, former Representative Henry Hyde also introduced another so-called “Hyde Amendment,” enacted in late 1997 as an important safeguard against abusive prosecution.  This Hyde Amendment has been hailed as a victory for defendants’ rights, and a timely response to abusive acts of government officials.  The House overwhelmingly passed Rep. Hyde’s rider to the final 1997 Department of Justice appropriations bill, now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. The 1997 Hyde Amendment brought “a measure of sunshine” and “a measure of judicial oversight,” into a courtroom forum “far removed from the catacombs of DOJ’s internal review processes,” where issues of abusive prosecution had “heretofore been confined, and many would say, swept under the rug.”1 The 1997 Hyde Amendment allows federal courts to award attorneys’ fees and costs to criminal defendants (who were not represented by assigned counsel paid for by the public) "where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious,  frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make such an award unjust." Fees and other expenses awarded under this provision must be paid by the offending agency (most likely the U.S. Attorney’s Office) through the established procedures of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which provides similar awards against the government in civil suits. Hyde’s original wording followed other EAJA provisions that apply to civil litigants who “substantially prevail,” but cries of “the sky is falling” from the DOJ resulted in the “vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith” limitations in the final law.2  Click here to read more about the 1997 Hyde Amendment. Thank-you, Henry Hyde, for your own “willingness to do the difficult things necessary to persuade Congress to act,” as well as for your work with FEAR in awakening America to the reality that “our treasured liberties are at stake,” and the "grave extent to which our constitutional protections have been violated and diminished in recent years."

2nd Circuit denies fees for attorneys who recovered money seized from multiple innocent claimants under USA PATRIOT Act

According to this opinion the government may avoid paying attorney fees incurred by an innocent owner simply by seizing property owned by multiple innocent owners.

On August 10, 2007, the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that CAFRA (Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000) exempts the government from liability for fees when seized currency is subject to “competing claims” of multiple innocent claimants who substantially prevail in a forfeiture case.  The appeals panel also held that CAFRA now provides the exclusive means of awarding fees to forfeiture defense attorneys, and therefore fees incurred defending a forfeiture case can no longer be awarded under EAJA (Equal Access to Justice Act).  While “mindful” that defense attorneys in U.S. v. $293,316 in United States Currency, 05-6522-cv, invested considerable time in helping nearly eighty innocent claimants recover their money, the panel nonetheless ruled that “under CAFRA those facts cannot justify the imposition of another burden on the public fisc.” 

Nearly eighty Pakistanis wished to transfer several thousand dollars from New York to Pakistan and entrusted their funds to three couriers on what they believed would be an overnight flight. The three couriers were also carrying some of their own money when they were apprehended as they were about to board a flight to Pakistan in September 2002, and were subsequently convicted under the bulk cash smuggling provision of the USA PATRIOT Act.

The Pakistanis who had entrusted their funds to the three couriers had violated no law. The appeals court recognized that “that many aliens use couriers to deliver money to friends and relatives because the couriers speak their language, charge no fees, and serve areas remote from the nearest Western Union branch.”  

After three years of litigation the government returned the seized funds to the innocent claimants.  The US District Court of the Eastern District of New York also concluded that only 50% of the funds owned by the convicted couriers could be forfeited to the government without violating the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 

Attorneys David B. Smith and John P. Donohue represented many of the innocent claimants as well as two of the three convicted couriers.  The two attorneys sought fees in an amount of $157,888 for their work representing claimants during the three years it took to recover the funds. However, the district court denied the attorney fee request because it determined there were "competing claims" to the same property within the meaning of CAFRA’s 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(2)(ii).  The district judge also denied an alternative award of fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.  

Arguing that it should be allowed to renege on its settlement agreement, the government had contended that it should not have to comply with the law and rules where it alleges threats to “national security.”²  Claimant Sami Khalil’s attorney, Steven Kessler, opened his summary argument to the Second Circuit:

With Old Glory waving behind it, appellant [Government] asserts, in the very first paragraph of its Preliminary Statement, that this is a terrorism case. Appellant uses appropriate catchwords and attempts to paint a picture of fear around appellee and the defendant funds. However, once the arguments begin and the facts of the settlement and the court’s decisions below unfold, appellant’s arguments for reversal of the district court’s orders have little, if anything, to do with terrorism.

Kessler’s client, claimant Sami Khalil, had never been charged with any crime related to the civil forfeiture proceeding. The only charges filed against anyone in relation to the seized currency were for failure to report currency carried while attempting to board a commercial flight to Egypt–not terrorism.  ... (Continued)

In George Albin versus Bakas, Taylor, Danko, Maldandado, Hooper and O’Leary (New Mexico state police and their superiors), Case number 26,134 filed April 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals for the State of New Mexico examined whether state police officers who seize cash under the authority of New Mexico’s Controlled Substances Act are required to comply with the requirements of the state Forfeiture Act, or whether they may instead transfer the cash to the federal government to bring a forfeiture action under federal law, then receive from the federal government a portion of the proceeds.  

In a tremendous victory for compelling police agencies to abide by state forfeiture reform laws, the appeals court ruled: "Just because the officers subsequently decided to transfer the cash to the federal government for the purpose of bringing a federal forfeiture action did not entitle them to ignore New Mexico law.”  Plaintiff George Albin is represented by Joseph P. Kennedy of the law firm Kennedy & Oliver, P.C., Albequerue.  Joseph Kennedy is also amember of FEAR and contributes pleadings to FEAR's Brief Bank II.

We acknowledge that the use of “adoptive seizures” is apparently wide-spread and follows a long history of forfeiture collaboration between state and federal agencies. We do not address whether, to what extent, or how an “adoptive seizure” to allow a federal forfeiture to proceed may be accomplished under the Forfeiture Act. Our holding in this case is limited: when property is seized by state police officers for forfeiture, compliance with the Forfeiture Act is required even if the state intends to transfer the property to the federal government to pursue a federal forfeiture action pursuant to an “adoptive seizure.” In this case, Defendants violated the Forfeiture Act.

The case began in during a traffic stop ...(continued)

Abstract:
Despite its failure to achieve its desired objectives, the War on Drugs continues on into a fourth decade with disastrous effects and extensive collateral damage. The current article explores civil asset forfeiture as one motivation that keeps the current drug policy intact. Specifically, it advances the premise that the current state of civil asset forfeiture law creates goal displacement that motivates law enforcement agencies to implement drug enforcement strategies that aggressively pursue civil asset forfeitures as a means of supplementing their budgets rather than as a legitimate tool for decreasing the supply of illicit drugs. The article explores how this goal displacement not only negatively impacts the progress of the War on Drugs, but also how it leads to disregard for individual due process rights, sometimes with tragic and life-altering consequences for innocent individuals. A brief discussion of the necessary reforms to civil asset forfeiture law is included.

Twenty-year-old Delane Johnson was not arrested when he consented to a search outside his apartment in July, 2006, and police coerced him into handing over $10,200 and signing Bradenton's Contraband Confiscation Agreement.  On February 9, 2007, state Circuit Judge Peter Dubensky rejected the city of Bradenton's motion to dismiss Johnson's legal challenge of the waiver agreement, and ordered police to either return Johnson's cash or file suit for forfeiture against the money in state court.  The court determined that the contract signed by Johnson "and the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract fail to comply with even the rudimentary elements of due process."

Though his ruling applies only to Johnson's case, the judge wrote a scathing criticism of Bradenton's waiver agreement policy: "Taken to its logical extreme," Dubensky wrote, the police "could present this agreement to any citizen stopped for any reason and request forfeiture of any item of property" in exchange for signing the document. The judge continued, "It is not remotely conceivable that the citizenry would countenance such a state of affairs."

Bradenton police spokesman stated the his department had not yet decided whether to return Johnson's money to him or file suit for forfeiture.  However, the department stands little chance of prevailing in a state forfeiture proceeding, as the statutory deadline for filing a notice of intent to forfeit under Florida law passed last October.

Attorney Varinia Van Ness, co-counsel for Johnson, questioned the impact Dubensky's favorable ruling will have on the police department, stating, "I'm hoping they will no longer use these agreements to take people's property." But if the department continues to go by its policy rather than state laws she may file a motion to reconsider the future of the department's policy. "I would hope they would start obeying the law of the land, so, in the future, this doesn't happen to other people," she said.

Continued: "Judge's ruling regarding these contracts has had little effect, if any, on the manner in which the Bradenton Police Department takes people's property and twists the law!" 

• Civil and Criminal Forfeiture Procedure (2004)
• Selected Criminal Forfeiture Forms (2004)
• Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual (2006)
• Selected Federal Asset Forfeiture Statutes... (2006)
  
• Money Laundering Statutes and Related Materials... (2006)
• Policy Regarding Disclosure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information [New Section] USAM (2006) 

• Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (August, 2000).  This publication is made up entirely of the text of statutes amended by CAFRA or provisions added by CAFRA, with strike-through fonts used to delineate omitted language.  It comes in handy when you need to compare the language of a section before and after it was amended by CAFRA.

• Selected Federal Asset Forfeiture Statutes, including statutes amended by the Criminal Law Technical Amendments Act of 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and CAFRA (January 2004).  This publication is made up of the text of forfeiture statutes and court rules applicable to forfeiture. It is useful because it puts all the forfeiture statutes and rules together in a concise format you can print out and put in a notebook to keep on your desk. This document is in three parts because of its size.  To download, click here:  [DOJ_SelectPt1]    [DOJ_SelectPt2]    [DOJ_SelectPt3]

Forfeiture victims and forfeiture defense lawyers need this book!  It's big – 500 pages in 8-1/2 X 11" format, in 11 point type, with  2,629 footnotes.   Even though it was published 2001, the law is still up to date.  It's comprehensive. And "it's readable!" said Jody Neal-Post.  Forfeiture victims trying to represent themselves pro se need this book – particularly inmates, who don't have access to adequate research tools. 

Profits from the sale of the FEAR Manual helps keep FEAR afloat – so you're helping the cause while you help yourself!

The official annual reports for the federal Forfeiture Funds are online.  For the Department of Justice's fund see  DOJ's website Reports to Congress. The Treasury Department's reports are online at   http://www.eoaf.treas.gov/AnnualReports-text.asp.